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Spendthrift  in  America?  On  Two 
Decades  of  Decline  in  the 
U.S.  Saving  Rate 
1. Introduction 
During  the  past  two  decades,  the  personal  saving  rate in  the  United 
States  has  fallen  dramatically.  From a typical  and  quite  steady  level  of 
around 8% during the sixties and seventies,  it has declined  to below  2% 
in 1997, and preliminary  estimates  put the rate at ?%  in 1998 and nega- 
tive so far in 1999. Figure la  displays  the U.S.  personal  saving  rate from 
1959 to 1998 and makes clear the magnitude  of the change.1 
This change  does  not merely  reflect labelling  or measurement  issues. 
In  particular,  for  the  majority  of  this  decline,  it  is  not  the  case  that 
businesses  or governments  have  increased  their  saving  with  national 
saving  unaffected.  Since  the  National  Income  and  Product  Account 
(NIPA) definitions  of savings  rates are neither transparent nor represen- 
tative of basic economic  concepts,  the simplest  way  to judge  the impor- 
tance of this shift in the U.S.  economy  is to examine  whether  consump- 
For useful  comments  and  discussions,  I am  grateful  to  Ben  Bernanke,  Angus  Deaton, 
Michael Horvath,  Rodolfo Manuelli, Julio Rotemberg, John Karl Scholz,  and participants at 
the NBER Macroeconomics  Annual conference,  particularly my discussants,  and especially 
Pierre Olivier Gourinchas  and Kenneth  West. Eric Hurst and Joe Lupton provided  invalu- 
able consultations  on using  the early release  PSID data. I thank Karen Dynan  for sharing 
her understanding  of NIPA saving  measures.  Grigori Kosenok provided  excellent research 
assistance  with  the aggregate  series.  This paper was written  while  I was  at the University 
of Wisconsin.  I alone am responsible  for any errors. 
1. An October 1999 revision  in the calculation  of personal  saving  raises these numbers  but 
does not alter the twenty-year  decline nor any of the main conclusions  of this paper. The 
personal  saving  rate is defined  as one minus  the ratio of personal  outlays  to disposable 
income.  In the national  accounts,  personal  outlays  are personal  consumption  expendi- 
tures plus  interest  paid by persons  and personal  transfer payments  abroad; disposable 
income  is labor income,  proprietors'  income,  rental income,  personal  interest  and divi- 
dend  income,  and  transfer payments  to persons  less  personal  contributions  for social 
insurance  and personal  tax and nontax payments. 318 .  PARKER 
Figure  1 (a) U.S.  PERSONAL SAVING RATE, 1959-1998;  (b) U.S.  PERSONAL 
CONSUMPTION  EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP, 1959-1998 
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tion  has  risen  as a share  of national  output.  Figure  lb  shows  that the 
decline  in  personal  saving  has  largely  been  mirrored  on  the  expendi- 
ture side  of the national  accounts.  The ratio of consumption  to GDP in 
the United  States was  roughly  constant  from 1950 to 1980, and has risen 
by 6 percentage  points  during  the past two  decades.2 
While the ratio of consumption  to income  has risen significantly  since 
2. Since this paper was written (and of importance to the discussion), the Bureau of 
Economic  Analysis has released  a major  revision of the National  Accounts  that reclassi- 
fies expenditures on software as investment, treats government pension plans in the 
same manner as private  pension plans, and removes some asset transfers  from dispos- 
able income. The revised data still show an 8 percentage  point decline in the personal 
saving rate  and a 5 (rather  than 6) percentage  point increase  in the consumption  share  of 
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1980, it is worth noting  that this ratio has not risen in the past few years. 
The recent decline  in the personal  saving  rate that has received  so much 
attention from journalists and policymakers  is not reflected in the ratio of 
consumption  to output.  As the next section  shows,  this decline  is more 
than offset by increases  in saving  by governments  and businesses. 
This paper  focuses  on the fundamental  and significant  change  in the 
allocation  of the output  of the U.S.  economy  documented  in Figure lb: 
Why  has  the  largest  economy  in the  world  increased  its  consumption 
expenditures  by  6% of  output  in  a  twenty-year  period?  This  change 
poses  a basic  challenge  to  economists  as  those  who  seek  to  explain 
economic  outcomes.  Do we  understand  the allocation  of resources? 
This consumption  boom also has import for the economic  future of the 
United  States.  Saving  is the accumulation  of resources  on which  to base 
future consumption.  Absent  offsetting  changes  in the national economy, 
higher  consumption  generally  leads  to  a lower  capital  stock  and  thus 
affects wages  and national output in the future. If the present  low saving 
rate represents  an optimal  response  of well-functioning  markets to fun- 
damental  improvements  such  as  new  technologies,  then  policies  de- 
signed  to  stimulate  saving  are at best  unnecessary,  since  the  future  is 
rosy.  On  the  other  hand,  if high  consumption  rates  are the  results  of 
imprudent  fiscal policies  or malfunctioning  markets,  then anemic saving 
signals  an avoidably  worse  future.3 
Despite  the basic prediction  that lower  saving  and investment  lowers 
the  capital stock,  the  aggregate  wealth-to-income  ratio has  actually  in- 
creased  during  the period  of the consumption  boom.  While new  invest- 
ment  has  slowed,  the  revaluation  of  existing  assets  has  kept  wealth 
levels  high  relative  to  national  output,  raising  the  possibility  that  the 
capital-to-income  ratio is not  declining.  Put differently,  the  saving  rate 
including  capital  gains  has  not  fallen.  As  is  clear from  the  paper  and 
comments  on  the  value  of  the  stock  market  in  this  volume,  however, 
high stock prices may not reflect only high expected  future dividends.  It 
seems  imprudent  to simply  assume  that saving  is in some  sense  high 
and  that  the  capital  stock  is  larger than  would  be  inferred  from  past 
investment.  Instead,  this  paper  considers  whether  the  appreciation  of 
assets,  whatever the driving mechanism,  can explain the changing alloca- 
tion of current output.  If it can, this suggests  that households  perceive 
the increase in the value  of the stock market as real wealth  creation.  As 
this paper demonstrates,  however,  the increase in wealth  alone does not 
explain  the consumption  boom. 
This paper begins by laying out the basic facts surrounding  the decline 
3. While uncovering  significant  evidence  about the behavior  of the consumption  ratio, this 
paper does not enter this debate directly. For examples  of these arguments  see Bernheim 
and Shoven  (1991), Bernheim and Scholz  (1993), Gustman  and Steinmeier  (1998). 320  PARKER 
in national saving  and how  a canonical aggregate  model  can account for 
these  changes.  I focus both on several  recently  observed  changes  in the 
U.S.  economy  and  on  the  main  current  theories  of  the  increased  con- 
sumption  of output.4 
I employ  two  main  sources  of data to study  the increase  in the  con- 
sumption  of output.  First, the paper uses  U.S.  national  accounts  data to 
compare  the  timing  of  the  consumption  boom  with  the  timing  of  the 
candidate  driving  forces,  and  to  ask what  expected  changes  would  be 
required to rationalize  observed  household  consumption  behavior.  Sec- 
ond,  the work  evaluates  cross-sectional  implications  of the theories  us- 
ing a custom-built  panel  dataset on U.S.  households.  As first suggested 
in Skinner  (1987), I impute  consumption  of nondurable  goods  and ser- 
vices  for each household  in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics  (PSID) 
using  information  from  the  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CEX) and 
the U.S. national accounts.  The resulting dataset contains 80,000 observa- 
tions  on  household  income,  consumption,  wealth,  and  demographic 
characteristics covering  the period  of interest. 
The analysis  leads to the following  main results.5 
First, the  decline  in  measured  saving  is  not  purely  due  to  a rise  in 
expenditures  without  an associated  rise in consumption.  That is, house- 
holds  are not simply  spending  more on durable goods  and thereby shift- 
ing the composition  of their savings. 
Second,  the  consumption  boom  cannot  be  explained  by  decreased 
government  purchases  "crowding  in" consumption.  The sum of govern- 
ment  and household  expenditures  on goods  and services  has also risen 
over  this  period.  Further,  the  declines  in  government  spending  that 
would  have  to be expected  to rationalize  the consumption  boom  are, to 
the author, implausibly  large. 
Third,  the  data  suggest  that at most  one-fifth  of  the  increase  in the 
ratio  of  consumption  to  income  can  be  explained  by  changes  in  the 
ratio of household  wealth  to income.  The consumption  boom  precedes 
the  recently  observed  increases  in  wealth,  and  the  national  saving 
rate has  actually  risen  coincident  with  the  stock-market  boom  of  the 
late  1990s.  Additionally,  the  increases  in consumption-to-income  ratios 
4. There is no shortage  of theories that can "explain" the decline in saving,  once one allows 
any  combination  of changing  structural parameters  or shifting  definitions  as plausible 
candidates.  This paper  limits the scope  of its investigation  to the main current theories 
and  looks  at the  data with  these  explanations  in mind.  Further, this paper  focuses  on 
ruling out monocausal  explanations  and upon  describing behavior. 
5. While  much  relevant  literature is cited where  appropriate,  the literature is too large to 
cover  in detail here.  See  Browning  and Lusardi  (1996), Hayashi  (1997), and Attanasio 
(1997b) for an overview  of the state of empirical research on saving. Spendthrift  in America?  *  321 
across  groups  are not  related  to the  distribution  of wealth,  homeown- 
ership,  or pension  participation.  Changes  in  asset  values  are not  the 
main force driving  the relative increase in consumption. 
Fourth,  during  this  period  of  rising  consumption  share,  the  growth 
rate of real consumption  per capita was  low and real interest rates were 
relatively  high.  Absent  a run of expectational  errors, the  consumption 
Euler equation  implies  that the  actual or effective  discount  rate of  the 
representative  agent was high.  Additionally,  there is a strong correlation 
between  the  real interest  rate and  consumption  growth  within  the pe- 
riod  of  consumption  boom.  That is,  the  aggregate  consumption  Euler 
equation provides  a better description  of the data during this period than 
in previous  periods. 
Fifth, turning to evaluating  explanations  that are consistent  with such 
increased  impatience,  the changing  age distribution  and income-by-age 
distribution  of the population  are not important causes  of the consump- 
tion  boom.  Nor,  sixth,  can financial  innovation  which  relaxes  liquidity 
constraints  and potentially  reduces  precautionary  saving  be blamed  for 
the  consumption  boom.  Given  the  observed  increases  in  debt,  this 
source  can  generate  at most  one-third  of  the  increase  in consumption 
observed  to date. 
Seventh,  the consumption-to-income  ratio of each generation  is larger 
than that of the generation  before it.6 This implies  that intergenerational 
fiscal  transfers  alone  cannot  account  for  the  decline  in  saving.  Thus, 
either different factors have increased  the consumption  of different gen- 
erations,  or general  optimism  or  a preference  shift  has  increased  the 
consumption-to-income  ratios of all households.7 
In sum,  the analysis  reveals  that each of the major current theories  of 
the  decline  in the  U.S.  saving  rate fails on its own  to match significant 
aspects  of the  macroeconomic  or household  data.  The concluding  sec- 
tion of the paper discusses  some combinations  of theories that are consis- 
tent with  the stylized  facts uncovered  in this paper and with the limited 
roles found  for the monocausal  explanations. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  describes  the 
history  of the decline  in the personal  saving  rate and its relationship  to 
the allocation  of output.  Section  3 presents  a canonical aggregate  model 
6. As  will  be  shown,  this  can be  explained  either  by  a time  effect  increasing  everyone's 
consumption-to-income  ratio or by true cohort effects,  as is described here.  In this latter 
case,  while  the changing  age distribution  of the population  is irrelevant, who  is at each 
age is very relevant. 
7. An example  of such a combination  of factors is federal transfers from future generations 
to the  elderly  and financial  innovations  that allow  the young  to consume  more  out  of 
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and the classes  of explanations  for the consumption  boom that the paper 
considers.  Section  4 evaluates  a subset  of  the  theories  using  U.S.  na- 
tional  accounts  data and in doing  so provides  a more  detailed  descrip- 
tion  of  the  aggregate  facts.  Section  5 describes  the  main  features  and 
construction  of the  household-level  dataset  that is used  to further test 
the theories  in Sections  6, 7, and 8. These  sections  differ by methodol- 
ogy: Section  6 decomposes  the  consumption-to-income  ratios into  age, 
time, and cohort effects; Section 7 models  the cohort effect and estimates 
consumption  functions;  Section  8 estimates  Euler equations.  Section  9 
concludes.  A data appendix  is provided. 
2.  The  Decline  in the  U.S. Saving  Rates 
Before turning  to the theoretical  determinants  of the consumption  ratio 
and evaluating  these determinants  using  the aggregate  data, this section 
presents  the stylized  facts concerning  the declining  U.S.  saving  rates.8 It 
is important to clarify what has occurred before turning to possible  expla- 
nations.  The  section  is  structured  as being  about  saving  because  it is 
national  saving  (plus  international  capital  flows)  that  equals  total  na- 
tional investment. 
Is the precipitous  decline  in personal  saving  shown  in Figure la  lead- 
ing to lower  national  saving,  or is public and business  saving  offsetting 
the  decline?  Actually,  from private-saving  data, it is not even  clear that 
households  themselves  are  saving  less.  National  accounts  data  mis- 
allocate  several  categories  of saving  between  private  and business  sav- 
ing.  Personal  saving  includes  the  saving  of noncorporate,  nonfinancial 
businesses,  such  as  sole  proprietorships,  partnerships,  and  nonprofit 
organizations,  which  might be better included  in business  saving.  Addi- 
tionally,  because  disposable  personal  income  includes  nominal  rather 
than real interest  payments  to businesses,  personal  saving  is overstated 
relative to business  saving.9 
Given  that personal  saving  is confounded  with  business  saving,  the 
first question  is what  has happened  to their sum,  private saving.  Figure 
2a displays  the  private  saving  rate-the  ratio of  private  saving  to  na- 
tional  income-over  the  past  forty years.10 Prior to the  precipitous  de- 
8. In contemporaneous  research,  Gale and Sabelhaus  (1999)  analyze  the aggregate  data on 
saving and wealth and reach  similar  conclusions to those of this section. 
9. See Hendershott  and Peek (1988)  and Summers  and Carroll  (1987). 
10. NIPA  saving-rate  measures  have recently  been revised  so as to exclude  the capital  gains 
distributions  of mutual funds from  both saving and disposable  income. This is consis- 
tent with the national accounts' purpose of describing the allocation of newly pro- 
duced, final value added. Unfortunately,  this revision only goes back to 1982, so that 
there is a break  in the savings series in that year. However, these distributions  account Spendthrift  in America? ?  323 
Figure 2 (a) GROSS SAVINGS RATES 1959-1997;  (b) HOUSEHOLD  ASSETS 
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dine  in  personal  saving,  the  private  saving  rate was  nearly  constant. 
This stable  relationship  was  known  as Denison's  law  (Denison,  1958), 
but this law appears to have been  repealed.1 
for only  - percentage  point  of the  saving  rate in the  1980s.  Thus,  while  this  revision 
lowered  measured  private  saving  in the 1990s significantly,  carrying the revision  back 
farther would  have  negligible  effect on measured  saving  rates and the conclusions  of 
the present  analysis. 
11. In part, Denison's  law is also based  on an observed  high negative  correlation between 
personal  and  business  saving.  Hendershott  and  Peek  (1988)  argue  that  mismea- 
surement  generates  most  if not all of this negative  correlation  and thus that Denison's 
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Turning  now  to  government  saving,  higher  saving  by  the  govern- 
ment,  holding  expenditures  constant,  leads  to  lower  taxes  in 
the future.  The principal of Ricardian equivalence  states that if taxes are 
nondistortionary,  this  offset  is  complete:  households  observing  higher 
government  saving  save  less  themselves,  if government  purchases  of 
goods  are held constant.  Figure 2a also shows  that government  saving- 
the difference  between  private  and gross saving-declined  through  the 
1950s,  1960s,  and  1970s and has  only  rebounded  from near zero in the 
early 1990s.12  Thus gross  saving  declined  steadily  from the late 1960s to 
the  early  1990s and  has  risen recently.  We can conclude  that while  the 
last five years of declining  private saving  have been  offset  by increased 
government  saving,  national  saving  has  still fallen  substantially  in the 
past twenty  years. 
One  reason  for pausing  to examine  national  saving-and  not  simply 
focusing  on  consumption-to-income  ratios  throughout-is  that saving 
and  investment  have  moved  in lockstep  over  most  of the  postwar  pe- 
riod. Capital inflows  have not offset the decline in saving,  either because 
of  an offsetting  temporal  pattern  of changes  in  the  world  economy  or 
because  of  any  one  of  the  proposed  rationalizations  of  the  Feldstein- 
Horioka puzzle.  Nevertheless,  declining  national saving has been associ- 
ated with  a large decline  in new  investment  as a share of GDP over the 
past twenty  years. Ultimately,  and ceteris paribus, one would  expect this 
decline  of roughly  one-fifth  in gross investment  to lower the U.S. capital 
stock per worker by one-fifth. 
As discussed  in the introduction,  however,  the value  of extant assets, 
has not declined.  The stock of wealth  in the U.S.  has risen as a share of 
income  over  the past twenty  years.  Figure 2b shows  that net worth,  as 
measured  in the flow-of-funds  data, has increased  as a share of dispos- 
able income  during the period  of declining  saving.  While the flow of the 
share of output  stored  for future production  is declining  over time,  the 
value  of the  stock  is rising.  Put slightly  differently,  while  active  saving 
has decreased,  the change  in household  wealth  as a share of income  has 
increased.13 
These coincident  trends raise two puzzles.  First, why  has wealth  risen 
while  saving  has  fallen?  This  question  is  addressed  elsewhere  in  this 
volume.  Second,  what  has  driven  the  decline  in  active  saving  and  the 
12. This is the official  measure of government saving, which does not include changes in 
government debts associated  with social security and the implicit and violable prom- 
ises to future generations.  Officially,  government  obligations  held by the public  rose by 
about  20%  of GDP from 1979  to 1995  and have declined  by about 5%  since. 
13. This fact is also present in the PSID  data that will be used subsequently (Hurst,  Luoh, 
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increasing  consumption  of output? In the rest of this paper we  focus  on 
the latter question. 
3.  The  Canonical  Theory  and  Main  Explanations 
This section  discusses  the main explanations  for the consumption  boom 
in the context  of a canonical  macroeconomic  model.  In subsequent  sec- 
tions,  these  explanations  are evaluated  using  aggregate  time-series  evi- 
dence  and panel  data on household  behavior. 
To provide  a framework  for analyzing  the decrease  in saving  and the 
increase  in  the  consumption  share  of  output,  I begin  with  a standard 
Ramsey economy.  Aggregate  output,  Y, is produced  from the aggregate 
capital  stock,  K, and  total labor in  the  economy,  N,  using  a constant- 
returns-to-scale  production  technology: 
Y = F(K, AN), 
where A is an exogenous  Harrod-neutral technology  that grows at rate a. 
Let the labor force grow at exogenous  rate n, and let capital depreciate at 
rate 8. Then one  can rearrange the standard capital accumulation  equa- 
tion to solve  for the consumption  share of output: 
c  k  k 
-  -  g-(n  + a +  )  -  k  (3.1) 
y  f(k)  f(k) 
where C is aggregate consumption,  lowercase  letters denote per-effective- 
worker values  (e.g.,  c  C/AN), g is the rate of government  consumption 
of output  in steady  state, andf(k)  F(k,l).  In steady  state, the consump- 
tion  ratio is related  only  to the  accumulated  capital stock,  the  share  of 
output consumed  by the government,  and the exogenous  rates of technol- 
ogy growth,  population  growth,  and depreciation. 
In the canonical Ramsey model  with  a single  infinite-lived  representa- 
tive agent maximizing  the present  discounted  value  of per capita utility 
flows,  the steady-state  real interest rate and thus the capital-output  ratio 
are tied down  by the modified  golden  rule. Assuming  a Cobb-Douglas 
production  function,  the consumption  share of output  in steady  state is 
c  a(n +a  +  ) 
1-g-r+  (3.2) 
a(n + a +  8)  = 
n-  a  +-  (3.3)  p'5 326 *  PARKER 
where  r is the real interest  rate, p is the discount  rate of the representa- 
tive  agent,  a is the  share of output  that is paid  to capital, and  ao  is the 
intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  of the  representative  agent.  The 
consumption  ratio  is  increased  by  increases  in  impatience  and  by 
decreases  in government  spending,  the  growth  rate of population,  the 
capital  share,  and  the  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution.14  A  de- 
crease in the depreciation  rate has  a theoretically  ambiguous  effect but, 
for  reasonable  parameter  values,  increases  the  consumption  share  of 
output.  Similarly, an increase  in the  growth  rate of productivity  has  an 
ambiguous  effect  but,  for  reasonable  parameter  values,  increases  the 
consumption  share of output. 
Of the large number of possible  factors that can increase the consump- 
tion share according to equation  (3.3), this paper focuses  on several that 
are noticed in the literature or suggested  by recently observed  changes  in 
the  economy.  First, the  share  of output  consumed  by  the  government 
has declined  over the past twenty  years. A declining  rate of government 
spending  causes  a consumption  boom.  Second,  household  wealth  has 
increased  despite  low  active saving,  as documented  in Figures  1 and 2. 
An increase  in the capital stock causes  a transitory  consumption  boom. 
Finally, an  increase  in  the  discount  rate of  the  representative  agent 
increases  the  consumption  share  of  output.  While  this  cannot  be  ob- 
served  directly, several  existing  theories  imply  an increase  in the effec- 
tive  discount  rate of the aggregate  consumer.15 First, the social security 
system  is  currently  making  large  transfers  from  future  generations  to 
those  alive  today. Considering  the  representative  agent  derived  from a 
life-cycle model,  this increased intergenerational  redistribution temporar- 
ily  increases  the  effective  discount  rate  of  the  representative  agent.16 
Thus the social  security  system  is considered  as a potential  explanation 
for the increase  in the consumption  share.  Second,  since  households  at 
different  ages  have  different  propensities  to  consume  out  of  total  re- 
sources,  changes  in  the  age  distribution  of  the  population  change  the 
effective  discount  rate of the representative  agent.  The aging of the baby 
boom  generation  and  the  increased  life  span  of  the  typical  American 
have  changed  the demographic  structure of the U.S.  and may also have 
driven  up the consumption  share of output. 
14. For all of these  effects,  the change  in consumption  share at impact is the same as in the 
long run except that a decrease in the capital share can cause the consumption  share to 
decline  at impact. 
15. I do not  consider  one  potential  explanation,  advanced  in Carroll and Weil (1994) and 
Paxson (1996). Habit formation tends  to lead the growth  rate of consumption  to decline 
slowly  following  a slowdown  in growth. 
16. That is,  in  a certainty  model,  intergenerational  transfers  to  the  present  increase  the 
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Third, in a model  in which  some  households  face large idiosyncratic 
risk or liquidity  constraints,  some  saving  is driven by precautionary  or 
liquidity  concerns.  In the past twenty  years,  there has been  an increase 
in  the  financial  instruments  employed  by  Americans  and  a significant 
increase in the ratio of debt to income.  Thus I consider  relaxed liquidity 
constraints  as  a possible  explanation  for the  increase  in the  consump- 
tion-to-income  ratio.17  Finally, while not observed,  there has been specu- 
lation that saving behavior  differs by cohort. One version  of this story is 
that households  who  did not live through  the Great Depression  have  a 
lower propensity  to save than those who  did. I examine  whether  there is 
evidence  of an increase  in the  discount  rate of the representative  agent 
due to more patient older generations  being  replaced by more impatient 
younger  ones. 
4. A Quick  Tour  of  Aggregate  Evidence 
In this section,  I analyze  which  if any of the explanations  just discussed 
are consistent  with  the  observed  changes  in the  aggregate  economy.  I 
focus on timing, on relative magnitudes,  and on the composition  of aggre- 
gate consumption.  This first pass at the data is complemented  later in the 
paper by a thorough  evaluation  using  household-level  survey  data. 
Before seeking  to explain  the increase  in the consumption  share,  this 
section  dismisses  the  possibility  that  consumption  expenditures  have 
increased while  consumption  has not. Suppose  that there were a relative 
preference  shift or price decline  such  that the representative  household 
sought  to  increase  the  share  of  its  consumption  flows  that  are due  to 
durable  goods.  Since  the  NIPA measure  expenditures  rather than con- 
sumption,  an  increase  in  the  share  of  consumption  coming  from  the 
service  flows  from durable goods  would  generate  a boom  in consump- 
tion expenditures.  In fact, however,  the observed  increase in consump- 
tion  expenditures  relative  to  income  would  not  represent  a decline  in 
saving rates, but rather a shift of saving from capital to durable consump- 
tion goods.18 
This  supposition  is  easily  rejected  by  an  examination  of  household 
budget  shares.  Working  with  reference  to  GDP  rather than  total  con- 
sumption,  the  ratio of expenditures  on  durable  goods  to GDP has  re- 
17. See Caballero (1991), Ayagari (1993), and Carroll (1997). 
18. Durable goods  do not include  housing.  Housing  services  are counted  as consumption, 
while  housing-stock  depreciation  and investment  are counted  as capital consumption 
allowance  and investment.  Changes  in household  wealth  due  to changing  homeown- 
ership patterns are correctly reflected in the figures on saving.  See Bureau of Economic 
Analysis  (1987, 1997). 328 - PARKER 
mained  steady  since  1959, falling by a tenth  of a percentage  point  from 
1959 to 1979 and rising by a tenth of a percentage  point  since. 
Turning now  to the main  explanations  proposed  in the previous  sec- 
tion,  we  will  see  that there  is little  aggregate  evidence  that declines  in 
government  spending  or appreciation  of existing  assets  caused  the  in- 
crease in consumption  to income.  Since during the past twenty  years the 
real interest rate was relatively high and the growth  rate of consumption 
relatively  low, the data do suggest  that the effective  discount  rate of the 
representative  agent has increased. 
4.1 REDUCTIONS  IN GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES 
Is the  consumption  boom  driven  by  a decreasing  share  of output  pur- 
chased  by  the  government,  due  to  the  so-called  "peace  dividend"  for 
example?  In steady  state,  the  canonical  model  of Section  3 implies  that 
the share of national  output  consumed  by households  and the govern- 
ment together  is constant  [equation  (3.3)]. 
A steady-state  explanation  can be quickly dismissed.  Figure 3 shows 
that  the  share  of output  devoted  to the  purchases  of both  households 
and governments  has risen over the past twenty  years. The purchases  of 
goods  and  services  by  governments  have  fallen  by  about  3 percentage 
points  of GDP over  the past  ten  years,  but this  decline  is concentrated 
after most  of the increase  in the consumption  share.19 A small piece  of 
evidence  is  provided  by  the  real  interest  rate.  The  real  interest  rate 
should  be  unchanged  by  a decrease  in  the  demand  for output  by  the 
government.  During  the  past  twenty  years,  the  real interest  rate has 
been  singificantly  higher than it was  in the previous  twenty. 
There is however  the  possibility  that a non-steady-state  explanation 
could work. That is, could the consumption  boom be due to the expecta- 
tion of both the currently observed  decline  in government  spending  and 
further declines  in government  spending  in the future? This hypothesis 
is consistent  with  a high  real interest rate and a high consumption  share 
of  output.  If households  expect  lower  government  purchases  in  the 
future, consumption  of the extra output  available is smoothed  by reduc- 
ing investment  and the capital stock in the present,  thus  increasing  the 
real interest  rate. 
To evaluate  this  explanation,  I ask  what  changes  would  have  to be 
expected  to rationalize  the  observed  consumption  boom.  To keep  mat- 
ters transparent,  general,  and easily reproducible,  the present values  are 
calculated  holding  the real interest rate constant.  Such experiments  pro- 
19. Also,  the  constant  consumption  share  and  the  declining  share  of  government  pur- 
chases  over the past five years suggests  no "crowding  in" of consumption  in response 
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Figure  3 CONSUMPTION  AND GOVERNMENT  SPENDING  AS A SHARE 
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vide  a  lower  bound  on  the  expected  future  declines  in  government 
spending.20 
First, what  is the  expected  steady-state  share  of government  spend- 
ing?  The  average  ratio of  government  and  consumption  purchases  to 
GDP from 1959 to 1979 is 84%. Given  the current ratio of personal  con- 
sumption  expenditures  to GDP of 68%, equation  (3.3) implies  that the 
expected  steady-state  ratio of  government  spending  to  output  is  16%. 
Second,  what accumulated  value from the consumption  boom must be 
recovered  from lower  government  spending?  Consider  first the counter- 
factual that the consumption  ratio remained  at its 1959-1979  value  over 
the  1979-1998  period.  The present  value  of the  excess  of the  observed 
consumption  series  over this alternative  stands  at 5782 billion  1992 dol- 
lars, or three-quarters  of a year of GDP, when  accumulated  at a 3% real 
interest  rate.  The  decline  in  government  spending  as  a share  of GDP 
20. The fact that the partial equilibrium experiment provides  a lower bound  can most easily 
be  seen  in  two  steps.  First, consider  the  household  budget  constraint.  Because  the 
capital  stock  declines  as consumption  rises  and  then  rises  as  government  spending 
further declines,  the  real interest  rate is high  when  the household  is borrowing  from 
the future (reducing  capital below  the steady-state  level).  Thus,  to "pay off" the early 
consumption  boom  requires greater saving  (a greater decline  in government  spending 
in the future) than if the interest  rate had been  constant.  Second,  since we  see that the 
current ratio of consumption  to income  and the real interest rate should  decline  as we 
get  to  steady  state,  the  steady-state  consumption-to-income  ratio  is  actually  higher 
than  the  observed  one,  thus  requiring  a still-lower  steady-state  level  of  government 
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since  its  local peak  of 21% in  1987 cumulates  to only  1400 billion  1992 
dollars to date. 
One path of government  purchases  that can rationalize  the consump- 
tion boom  is that the ratio of government  purchases  to GDP declines  by 
half a percentage  point  a year to 13%, stays  there for 15 years,  and rises 
again by half a percentage  point  a year to 16%. Thus,  to rationalize  the 
consumption  boom  from  this  source  requires  expectations  of  extreme 
declines  in  government  purchases.  To date,  no  government  spending 
movements  have occurred that can rationalize more than a small fraction 
of the consumption  boom. 
4.2 APPRECIATION  OF EXISTING  ASSETS 
As shown  in Figure 2b, the value  of assets  owned  by the representative 
household  has  been  increasing  relative  to its income.  Can this  rise ex- 
plain the increase in the consumption-to-income  ratio? 
First, what might  generate  the large increases in the ratio of net worth 
to income  while  the investment  share is low  and the real interest rate is 
high?  If households  realize  that the  capital stock was  higher  than  they 
had thought,  then the consumption  share would  increase,  but, counter- 
factually, the real interest rate would  be low. Instead suppose  that house- 
holds  expect  a big  increase  in  output  in  the  future.  Then  households 
should  decumulate  capital,  the real interest  rate rise,  and consumption 
rise  as  a  share  of  output.  These  real-interest-rate,  consumption,  and 
output  movements  are as  observed  in  the  data.  If, in  addition,  firms 
must  invest  now,  for example  in information  technologies,  in order to 
reap  these  future  productivity  gains,  then  it  is  also  possible  for  the 
theory  to predict  an increase  in the ratio of net worth  to income,  as in 
Greenwood  and Yorukoglu (1997). If this investment  is not measured  as 
output  or investment,  then consumption  rises as a share of output.21 
An  alternative  theory  is simply  that asset  prices  follow  fads  or bub- 
bles.  In either  case,  two  problems  are encountered  in trying to explain 
the consumption  boom  with  the increase in wealth. 
First, the timing  is wrong.  The increase  in the wealth-to-income  ratio 
is mainly  due  to the increases  in the values  of financial assets-largely 
stocks-as  shown  in the lowest  curve in Figure 2b. This increase occurs 
primarily in the last five years,  a time when  personal  saving  is declining 
but the consumption-to-output  ratio is constant. 
Second,  focusing  on  the years  over  which  the  consumption  share of 
21. See Greenwood  and Yorukoglu (1997) and Greenwood,  Hercowitz,  and Krusell (1997), 
or assume  that the  future  increase  in productivity  is associated  with  certain existing 
pieces  of capital. Another  possible  shift in technology  is a decrease  in the capital share 
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income  increased,  we  see that the total increase in the ratio of net worth 
to income  from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s equals about one-third of 
a year of GDP. The marginal propensity  to consume  out of wealth  must 
be one-sixth  to rationalize the consumption  boom.  If one assumes  such a 
high  marginal  propensity  to consume,  however,  then  the lack of a con- 
sumption  response  to recent increases  in wealth  is puzzling. 
A role for wealth  accumulation  becomes  more plausible  if one ignores 
timing  and simply  observes  that budget  constraints  relate consumption 
to wealth.  The increase  in the ratio of net worth to income  from the late 
1970s  to  1997 amounts  to  two-thirds  of  a year  of  GDP. The  marginal 
propensity  to consume  out of wealth  need now  only be 9% to rationalize 
the  consumption  boom.22 Thus,  while  the  aggregate  data  cast  some 
doubt on the role of wealth,  this explanation  for the consumption  boom 
is a main focus  of the subsequent  analysis  of household  data. 
4.3 INCREASES  IN IMPATIENCE  OR THE  PROPENSITY 
TO CONSUME 
As noted  at the end of Section 3, several current explanations  argue that 
the effective  discount  rate or the propensity  to consume  of the represen- 
tative agent has increased.  Such an increase  is consistent  with  two main 
coincident  facts.  First, as already mentioned,  the real interest  rate was 
high  during  the  consumption  boom  relative  to  the  previous  two  de- 
cades.  This suggests  that the demand  for output  is relatively  high.  Sec- 
ond,  as documented  in the first two rows  of Table 1, the growth  rate of 
real consumption  per capita actually has slowed.  Within the context of a 
Ramsey  economy,  the  Euler  equation  governs  consumption  growth. 
Without a change in the effective  discount  rate, a higher real interest rate 
should  be associated  with a higher average growth  rate of consumption, 
not a lower one. 
I now  turn to two of the explanations  discussed  at the end of Section 3: 
increases  in  government  transfers  from  future  to present  generations, 
and  financial  innovation  and  increases  in debt.  These  explanations  are 
also evaluated  in Sections  6, 7, and 8, using  cross-sectional  implications 
of these  theories  and household  data. 
4.3.1  Increasing Government Transfers to  Older Generations  During  the 
period  of the increasing  consumption  share of output,  the U.S.  govern- 
ment has increased  its reallocation  of wealth  from future to current gen- 
erations.  In a pure  life-cycle  model,  the beneficiaries  of these  transfers 
22. Poterba and Samwick  (1995) and Ludvigson  and Steindel  (1999) also demonstrate  that 
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Table  1  CONSUMPTION  GROWTH  AND EXPENDITURE  SHARES 
Real  Per  Capita  Annual  Growth  Rate  (%) 
1959-69  1969-79  1979-89  1989-98a 
Total  PCE  3.0  2.4  2.0  1.6 
Nondurable goods and services  2.8  2.3  1.8  1.4 
Change  in Share  of GDP  (%) 
1959-69  1969-79  1979-89  1989-98a 
Total PCE  -1.2  0.7  3.8  2.1 
Durable  goods  0.3  -0.4  0.3  -0.2 
Nondurable  goods  -3.5  -1.4  -3.0  -1.9 
Services  2.0  2.5  6.5  4.2 
Medical  care  1.3  1.6  2.6  1.7 
Other services  0.8  0.3  2.3  1.9 
Housing  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.2 
a 1998  estimates  are preliminary. 
consume  more  than  their  pretransfer  wealth,  while  other  generations 
consume  less.  In the United  States,  social security and Medicare are the 
largest  of these  programs,  and  the  payments  to the  elderly  have  been 
consistently  rising,  as has  the  share  of medical  care in total consump- 
tion.  Gokhale,  Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus  (1996) argue that this redistribu- 
tion can explain  the consumption  boom. 
To provide  a first evaluation  of this explanation,  the second  panel  of 
Table 1 presents  the budget  shares  of different  categories  of consump- 
tion,  including  medical  care.  The boom  in  consumption  is  more  than 
entirely due to increased  consumption  of services,  of which  medical care 
is  a  major  component.  The  output  share  of  purchases  of  goods- 
nondurable  and  durable-has  declined  by nearly  10 percentage  points 
since  1959. Two-thirds of this decline  is a steady  decrease  in the share of 
consumption  that is food.  Within  services,  the largest increases  in con- 
sumption  are due  to spending  on medical  care and on other services.23 
From 1979 to 1998, the growth  in the share of medical  care is 4.3% and 
the growth  in the share of other services  is 4.2%, both large when  com- 
pared  to the 5.9% increase  in the total consumption  to GDP ratio. This 
23. Other  services  include  transportation  services  and  household  operations  (which  are 
usually  their own  categories)  and miscellaneous  services  related  to clothing,  accesso- 
ries,  and  jewelry  (such  as  cleaning,  repair,  and  storage);  personal  business  such  as 
banking,  legal,  and funeral services; recreational services  such  as cable TV, club mem- 
berships,  theater  tickets,  and pet-related  costs; religious  activities; foreign  travel; and 
finally  education  and  other  day-care  costs.  See  Bureau of Economic  Analysis  (1990). Spendthrift  in America?  *  333 
seems  to suggest  that the consumption  boom can largely be explained by 
government  provision  of medical  care free of charge to the elderly. 
However,  a slightly  different  picture  emerges  if one  compares  these 
recent changes,  which  occurred contemporaneously  with  the consump- 
tion  boom,  with  the  changes  that  occurred  over  the  previous  twenty 
years, during which the consumption-to-GDP  ratio was constant.  Table 1 
again  reveals  that  services  growth  is,  at least  in  an  accounting  sense, 
the cause  of the recent consumption  boom.  But, relative to growth  over 
the previous  twenty years, the increased consumption  of services is more 
evenly  distributed  among nonmedical  nonhousing  services,  medical ser- 
vices,  and housing.  The change  in medical  services  as a share of output 
from 1979 to 1998 exceeds  the change  over the previous  twenty  years by 
1.4 percentage  points.  It is also worth noting  that the transition to Medi- 
care was largely completed  prior to the consumption  boom.24 
In sum,  there is evidence  that the consumption  boom  is concentrated 
in  spending  on  services,  but  not  that  this  increased  spending  on  ser- 
vices  is  disproportionately  concentrated  on  medical  care.  Since  this 
evidence  is  far  from  conclusive,  I  later  evaluate  the  role  of  inter- 
generational  transfers,  including  Medicaid,  by  studying  which  house- 
holds  were  "overconsuming"  relative  to  their  ages,  wealth,  and  in- 
comes,  and  asking  whether  these  households  are in  cohorts  that  are 
receiving  large intergenerational  transfers.  In good  macroeconomic  tra- 
dition,  the remainder  of the paper will focus on output  as one good. 
4.3.2  Financial Innovations and Increases  in Debt  During  the past twenty 
years,  gross debt has risen as a share of disposable  income.  As shown  in 
Figure 2b, the difference between  the ratios of total assets  to disposable 
income  and net worth  to disposable  income  have  increased  from 0.7 to 
nearly 1. If this increase represents  relaxed liquidity constraints  or finan- 
cial innovation  that allows  previously  constrained  households  to borrow 
to support  consumption,  then that innovation  would  lead to a transitory 
consumption  boom.  During  the  past  twenty  years,  credit  cards  have 
become  more widely  available and an increasing  amount  of debt is held 
on  them.  Also,  the  minimum  down  payment  required  to  purchase  a 
house  has  declined,  and  the  number  and  visibility  of  financial instru- 
ments  available to borrow against home  equity have increased. 
Financial  innovations  are not  able  to  account  for a large  increase  in 
consumption.  As noted  in the previous  subsection,  the share of expendi- 
tures on housing  services  rises during the consumption  boom.  However, 
the increase in the ratio of debt to output  is just over 20%. As calculated 
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in  Section  4.1,  the  present  value  of  the  consumption  boom  is  three- 
quarters of one year of GDP. If the increase in the debt ratio were entirely 
caused  by an exogenous  increase  in households'  ability to borrow, then 
financial  innovation  could  explain  at most  30% of the  increase  in con- 
sumption  to income  to date. 
4.4 THE  LIMITS  OF AGGREGATE  EVIDENCE 
Using  only  aggregate  data,  a significant  difficulty  in understanding  the 
decline  in  the  saving  rate is  lack  of exogeneity.  Thus  this  paper  now 
turns  to  household-level  data.  This  approach  has  three  advantages. 
First, the composition  of households  has changed  significantly  over the 
past twenty  years.  There are more retirees, more single-parent  families, 
and  greater  dispersion  in  household  income.  This  paper  uses  house- 
hold-level  data to evaluate  whether  such  changes  have  caused  the  de- 
cline in the saving  rate. Second,  several possible  causes  of the consump- 
tion boom  give  strong predictions  about the cross-sectional  distribution 
of  consumption  ratios.  For  example,  intergenerational  transfers  are 
expected  to raise consumption  by the currently elderly  and reduce it for 
the currently young.  Finally, absent full consumption  insurance,  house- 
hold  propensities  to consume  out  of idiosyncratic  asset  values  and  in- 
come  levels  can be used  to estimate  the response  of the aggregate  econ- 
omy to these  variables. 
The  next  section  describes  the  construction  of  a novel  dataset  that 
combines  information  from  two  household-level  survey  datasets  and 
NIPA data to generate a panel dataset with information  on consumption, 
income,  and wealth  at the household  level.  The remainder  of the paper 
uses  this  dataset  to evaluate  theories  of the  increase  in aggregate  con- 
sumption  relative to income. 
5.  Constructing  a Household-Level  Dataset 
In order to study the consumption  behavior  of households,  I employ  the 
Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CEX) to  impute  the  consumption  of 
services  and nondurable  goods  to each household  in the Panel Study of 
Income  Dynamics  (PSID) from 1979 to 1994. This yields  a panel  dataset 
on consumption  of households  that includes  a large set of demographic 
and income information  as well as three years of detailed wealth informa- 
tion.  [Skinner (1987) pioneers  the use of the CEX to impute  consumption 
to the PSID.] This section  briefly describes my procedure  for imputation 
and  the  important  features  of  the  final  dataset.  Additional  details  are 
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5.1. THE  PSID 
The PSID has been used  extensively  to study year-to-year fluctuations  in 
consumption,  and the main characteristics of the dataset are reasonably 
well known.  For the present  analysis,  using  PSID households  as the unit 
of analysis  has three main advantages.  First, the survey  provides  panel 
data over much  of the  time period  of interest  on over 5000 households 
per  year.  Data  from  1979 to  1994 are used  to  match  the  timing  of the 
consumption  boom.25 The PSID provides  weights  so that the means  in 
any year or category of household  can be aggregated  to produce a nation- 
ally representative  sample. 
Second,  the Survey  has repeated  measures  of food  consumption  and 
excellent  information  on household  income.  The main measure  of con- 
sumption  is usual  weekly  food  consumption,  and  this information  has 
been  gathered  in every  year of interest except  1988 and 1989. Food con- 
sumption  is measured  with  error, and this has hampered  studies  work- 
ing  with  Euler equations  and  relating  annual  consumption  changes  to 
observable  variables.  In much  of this study,  the focus  of interest will be 
long-term  movements  or movements  across  groups  of people,  so  that 
this mismeasurement  creates  fewer  difficulties.  The fact that food  con- 
sumption  is  not  typical  of  all consumption  expenditures  is  more  of  a 
concern,  and  this  concern  leads  to the joint  use  of the  CEX, as subse- 
quently  described. 
Income in the PSID is total posttransfer, pretax income,  so that it is not 
completely  comparable  to national income  in the NIPA. Nonetheless,  as 
demonstrated  in the appendix,  the ratio of food consumption  to income 
constructed  from aggregating  the PSID data has the same temporal pat- 
tern as that of the NIPA. The correlation between  the PSID series and the 
NIPA series is 0.93. 
Third, and most importantly, the survey contains accurate information 
on wealthholding  of households  in 1984, 1989, and  1994, a time period 
covering  the  heart of the  consumption  boom.  Such  information  is not 
available in the CEX alone.  The PSID data on wealth  include wealth held 
in saving  and checking  accounts,  money  market accounts,  certificates of 
deposit,  bonds,  stocks,  mutual funds,  IRAs, cash value of life insurance, 
trusts  and  estates,  main  home,  second  homes,  investment  real estate, 
cars, trucks, boats,  motor homes,  farm and business  wealth,  and collec- 
tions  of  things  for investment  purposes  (e.g.,  baseball  cards),  all less 
credit card, mortgage,  and "other" debts. The wealth data are comprehen- 
25. These  include  income  information  from the Survey year 1995. The 1994 and 1995 data 
are in early-release  form, and thus the relevant variables must be constructed from raw 
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sive and do an excellent job of reproducing  the wealth  of the bottom 99% 
of the wealth distribution in these categories of wealth (Juster, Smith, and 
Stafford, 1999). The only real shortcoming  of the PSID wealth  data is that 
pension  wealth  is unavailable.  The PSID does report whether  the house- 
hold has a pension,  and that information  is used  here. 
In order for a household  to be included  in the analysis,  it must have all 
the necessary  information  for the year in question.  Further, the observa- 
tion is dropped  if any of the necessary  information  is a major assignment 
made by the PSID staff. 
5.2  THE CEX 
In order  to  use  the  PSID to  analyze  the  increase  in  the  consumption 
share  of  output,  this  work  imputes  the  consumption  of  nondurable 
goods  and services  for each household.  I first estimate  the relationship 
between  this larger measure  of consumption  and a household's  level  of 
food  consumption  and demographic  characteristics, using  data from the 
Consumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CEX). The consumption  of nondurable 
goods  and  services  of households  in the  PSID is  then  predicted  using 
this estimated  relationship. 
The  CEX is  conducted  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor Statistics  in order  to 
construct  baskets  of goods  for use  in the bases  for the Consumer  Price 
Index and has been  run continuously  since  1980. The survey  has excel- 
lent  coverage  of  consumption  expenditures,  reasonable  data on  liquid 
assets,  and income  information  of moderate  quality.26  The survey  inter- 
views  about  5500  households  each  quarter  and  has  households  keep 
records  of consumption  expenditures,  which  are then  collected  by  the 
survey  at the end  of four three-month  interview  periods.  About  half of 
all households  make  it through  all the interviews,  and  sample  weights 
are given  so that a representative  sample  of nonrural households  can be 
recovered.  The CEX represents  the best source of information  on house- 
hold  consumption  across a large set of categories. 
The data used  here come from the family files of the CEX from 1980 to 
1993 and  from  extracts  made  publicly  available  by  the  Congressional 
Budget  Office and John Sabelhaus  through  the NBER.27  Each household 
contributes  one  data point  to the  employed  sample.  I drop  any house- 
hold  that is classified  as an incomplete  income  reporter, that has any of 
the crucial variables missing,  or that does  not report an income  measure 
contemporaneous  with  the  consumption  data.28 I  construct  variables 
26. See Lusardi (1996), Attanasio  (1994), and Branch (1994). 
27. See Bureau of Labor Statistics (1993) and http://www.nber.org/ces_cho.html. 
28. This procedure  cuts nearly  all households  that are listed  in the CBO/Sabelhaus/NBER 
data as not completing  all the interviews.  The weights  adjusted by the CBO for attrition 
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measuring  food  consumption  and  consumption  on  all NIPA categories 
of nondurable  goods  and  services  consumption.  Income  is pretax total 
family income  to match the concept  in the PSID. 
Finally, as for the PSID, I construct  the ratio of food  consumption  to 
income from the CEX and compare this with the NIPA series. The correla- 
tion between  the  CEX and NIPA series  is 0.78,  which  is not  as high  as 
that  from  the  PSID.  However,  as  discussed  in  the  Appendix,  it is  an 
acceptable level  for present  purposes. 
5.3 IMPUTING  EXPENDITURES  ON NONDURABLE  GOODS 
AND SERVICES 
Turning to the imputation  of consumption  for households  in the PSID, 
two  important  factors  drive  the  specification  of  the  imputation.  First, 
what  are the correct theoretical  concepts  that shift the relative utility of 
consumption  of food  and nonfood  items? Given  that food  has  declined 
significantly  as  a share  of  consumption  over  the  period  of interest,  to 
impute  nondurable  and  services  consumption  to households  it will be 
necessary  to  recognize  both  that  the  relative  price  of  food  changes 
through  time  and  that food  is a necessity,  so  that its budget  share  de- 
clines with increasing wealth.  Further, household  characteristics such as 
family  size,  number  of  earners,  and  retirement  status  may  shift  the 
relative utility of food consumption  vs.  consumption  of other goods. 
Second,  what variables are measured  in similar ways  in both surveys? 
The  imputation  is  only  valid  if  the  regressors  used  in  the  estimating 
equation  are the same  variables as those  in the predicting  equation.  As 
discussed  in the Appendix,  there is some  variation in the relative levels 
of the consumption  and income  series,  but the factors of interest are the 
time trends.  For all the regressors,  the survey  questions,  the levels,  and 
the  time  trends  are  compared  between  the  surveys,  and  they  match 
reasonably  well. 
The imputation  proceeds  in four steps.  First, using  the CEX data, the 
log of expenditures  on nondurable  goods  and services  is regressed  on a 
cubic polynomial  in the log of food consumption  and a set of regressors 
designed  to allow preferences  for relative consumption  to vary by family 
size,  age,  education  level,  labor-force status,  and  retirement  status.  To 
capture  differences  in  relative  prices  of  goods  over  time,  the  mean  is 
allowed  to vary by year. The regression  employs  37,730 households  and 
explains  80% of the variation in household  consumption. 
Second,  the estimated  parameters  are used  to predict consumption  of 
nondurable  goods  and  services  for each household  in the PSID. Third, 
the  imputed  consumption  for each  household  is  treated  as  a relative 
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scaled  up to include  medical  purchases  by the government.  This step  is 
similar to that of Gokhale,  Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus  (1996), who  assign 
medical  consumption  across  ages.  Their medical-care  adjustments  em- 
ploy  more  detailed  age-specific  adjustments  but  do  not  assign  these 
expenditures  in  relation  to  individual  consumption.  Finally,  the  con- 
sumption  of nondurable  goods  and services  in the NIPA in each year is 
allocated across households  in proportion  to each household's  consump- 
tion from the third step. 
After this imputation,  I have  a true panel  dataset  that covers  16 years 
from  1979 to  1994 and  contains  measures  of  income,  nondurable  and 
service  consumption  (for all years except  1988 and  1989), and wealth  in 
1984, 1989, and 1994. I turn now  to describing  the evolution  of consump- 
tion ratios across broad groups  of the population.  All nominal  data are 
made real using a price index constructed by dividing  nominal consump- 
tion of services  and nondurable  goods  by the same real quantity, where 
nondurable  and  services  consumption  is  made  real  using  the  NIPA 
chained  price indexes.  Data for the second  quarter of the year of interest 
are used. 
From here  on  the  term  "consumption"  is used  interchangeably  with 
the  more  cumbersome  term  "consumption  of  nondurable  goods  and 
services." 
6.  Growth  and  Demographic  Structure:  Age, Cohort,  and 
Time  Effects  in Consumption 
The United  States has  experienced  a large  increase  in the  share  of the 
population  that is  over  65 years  of  age  and  a bulge  in the  population 
distribution  associated  with  the aging  of the baby boom  generation.29 If 
households  of different  ages have  different propensities  to consume  out 
of lifetime  income,  then  there  is variation  in the  representative  agent's 
discount  rate. For example,  middle-aged  households  wish  to consume  at 
a greater  rate than  young  or old  households  since  they  tend  to  have 
more members.  Thus an economy  in which  a population  bulge  is enter- 
ing middle  age looks like a canonical Ramsey economy  with  a temporar- 
ily higher  effective  discount  rate.  Are the  observed  fluctuations  in the 
U.S.  age  distribution  leading  to fluctuations  in the  discount  rate of the 
representative  agent  that  are in  turn pushing  up  the  consumption-to- 
income  ratio? 
29. In addition,  there is a long-term  trend towards  slower population  growth  in the United 
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Table  2  CELL  SIZES  FOR  AGE  AND COHORT  GROUPS 
Cohort  Born  Cell  Size  Age Group  Cell  Size 
1905-09  1,722  19-24  7,090 
1910-14  2,799  25-29  12,838 
1915-19  3,264  30-34  13,075 
1920-24  3,973  35-39  10,427 
1925-29  4,725  40-44  7,319 
1930-34  4,488  45-49  5,263 
1935-39  4,135  50-54  4,702 
1940-44  5,462  55-59  4,421 
1945-49  9,331  60-64  4,225 
1950-54  13,024  65-69  3,850 
1955-59  13,627  70-74  3,063 
1960-64  8,339  75-85  3,208 
85+  583 
1893-05a  1,176 
1965-73a  3,999 
apartially  observed. 
6.1 WHO ARE  CONSUMING  MORE  OF THEIR  INCOME? 
Over the period  in question,  the elderly  as a group have increased  their 
share of consumption.  This fact suggests  an important role of decreasing 
lifetime  wealth  of the  young  and/or  increasing  transfers to the  elderly. 
However,  this trend significantly  predates  the current data and the con- 
sumption  boom.30 Following  in the  footsteps  of previous  studies  using 
micro  data,  the  analysis  of  the  household  data  begins  by  describing 
the  evolution  of consumption  and  consumption  ratios  across  different 
age groups  and time periods.31 Next,  this section  uses  a simple  life-cycle 
framework  to  identify  the  role  of  demographics  in  the  consumption 
boom. 
The analysis  first groups  the  data into birth cohorts  and age groups. 
Table 2 shows  the cells  and the cell sizes  chosen  for the analysis.  Ages 
are grouped  into 13 five-year  cells,  and the cohorts  are also split into  12 
cells.32 The  number  of  households  in  each  cohort  cell  and  age  group 
30. See Gokhale,  Kotlikoff,  and Sabelhaus  (1996,  Figure  1). 
31. This approach  is employed in the study of consumption and saving by Deaton and 
Paxson  (1994),  Attanasio  (1997a),  Deaton and Paxson  (1997),  and Alessie, Kapteyn,  and 
Lusardi  (1998). 
32. Two  partial  cohorts  are in the sample for too little time to properly  identify their actual 
cohort  effect. Of these cohorts, the youngest is only observed  in the relevant  age range 
for about half the sample. The oldest has some members  in the sample in every year, 340 *  PARKER 
varies  over  time.  There  are 14 years  of  data,  spread  over  the  16 years 
1979 to  1994. In general,  each  cohort  group  and  age  group  will be  de- 
noted  by  the  middle  age  or year  in  its range.  The number  of  data  af- 
forded  by  the  PSID  is  a  significant  advantage:  there  are  over  80,000 
observations  on  household  consumption  and  income.  This  is  an  un- 
weighted  look  at the  data.  Sample  weights  imply  quite  a different  age 
and cohort distribution  of the data, one that is representative  of the U.S. 
noninstitutional  population. 
To begin,  I use  the  sample  weights  and data in each cohort group  to 
construct  a measure  of the  average  log  consumption  of each  cohort  at 
each age.  Figure 4a displays  the consumption  of each cohort at different 
ages.  The life-cycle  pattern of hump-shaped  consumption  is clearly visi- 
ble.33 Also  noticeable  is the  artificially sudden  rise in consumption  that 
occurs  at age  65 due  to  the  allocation  of  medical  expenditures  by  the 
imputation  procedure.34 The figure shows,  for any cohort,  the combina- 
tion of both  age and time  effects  at work.  None  of the effects  are sepa- 
rately identified.  It could  be that all households  have  the same  lifetime 
wealth  and that the "endpoints"  of each segment  do not join due to time 
effects  that raise  the  endpoint  of each  cohort's  age  series  of consump- 
tion.  However,  productivity  growth  implies  that  younger  cohorts  are 
richer and  so  consume  more  than  their  elders  did  at the  same  age.  If 
there  were  no  time  effects,  then  consumption  profiles  of  younger  co- 
horts would  lie above  those  of their elders  due  solely  to cohort effects, 
which  would  be  due  in  turn  to  productivity  growth.  To identify  the 
separate  effects  of  age,  time,  and  cohort  requires  identifying  assump- 
tions,  which  are provided  shortly. 
Figure 4b displays  the  same  set  of information  as Figure 4a,  but  by 
year and for only four cohorts.  This figure shows  that over the period of 
the  consumption  boom,  the  cohort  whose  consumption  has  risen  the 
most  is that of households  born between  1955 and  1959, the  youngest 
cohort. While this would  seem to be evidence  that this younger  group is, 
in an accounting  sense,  the cause of the consumption  boom,  in fact, the 
age profile of consumption  for this cohort should  be increasing. 
Figure 5a and b show  the total consumption  of each cohort divided  by 
but  fewer  than  50 in each  year of the  1990s. These  partial cohorts  are used  only  in a 
subset  of the analysis,  and when  this is done  it is noted. 
33. This pattern has many interpretations  and has been the subject of much debate; see for 
example  Carroll and Summers  (1991), Attanasio  and Browning  (1995), and Gourinchas 
and Parker (1997). 
34. In the  analysis  of consumption  levels,  this  feature  of the  imputation  only  biases  the 
estimated  age effects.  In the growth-rate  regressions,  the artificial consumption  growth 
over these  years is removed  by a dummy  variable. Spendthrift  in America? *  341 
Figure 4 LOG NONDURABLES  CONSUMPTION  (a) BY AGE AND  COHORT, 
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the  total income  received  by  that cohort  by  age  and  time  respectively. 
Figure 5a emphasizes  the clear life-cycle  pattern of consumption  ratios, 
in which  the young  save  and the elderly  dissave.  Again  these  patterns 
are confounded  by the inability to see  people  of different  cohorts  at the 
same  age  and  in  the  same  year.  Looking  at the  general  shape  of  the 
profile,  one  sees  a mixture  of effects  at work.  That is,  since  the profiles 
for different  cohorts nearly join neatly  or overlap when  observed  at the 
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Figure 5 NONDURABLES  CONSUMPTION  TO INCOME  RATIOS  (a) BY  AGE 
AND COHORT,  (b) BY  YEAR  AND COHORT 
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same  ages,  it may  seem  that the  effect  of cohort  on  saving  behavior  is 
small.  In fact, however,  these  profiles  may  not join  or overlap  if time 
effects  are removed.  Figure 5b displays  the combination  of the effects of 
age  and  time  on  each  cohort  of households.  The cohort  born between 
1925 and 1929 clearly has the sharpest rise in consumption  ratio over the 
period; however,  the same caveat that applies to the increasing consump- 
tion of the young  applies  here.  During the 16-year period examined,  the 
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Figure 6 LOG NONDURABLES-CONSUMPTION  GROWTH (a) BY AGE AND 
COHORT, (b) BY YEAR AND  COHORT 
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youngest  households  in  this  cohort  age  from  50 to  65 and  the  oldest 
households  in this cohort move  from 54 to 69. Thus,  life-cycle  consider- 
ations  suggest  that this  group  should  move  from  saving  to  dissaving. 
Finally, Figure 6a and b display  the profiles  of the  average  of house- 
hold-level  consumption  growth.  As  is  typical  of  household  data,  the 
growth  rates of consumption  display  a fair amount  of variation,  but the 
life-cycle  figure  still  captures  a broad  age  pattern  in  the  same  way  as 
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Figures  4a and  5a.35 Household-level  variation  is potentially  useful  for 
identification  of the  underlying  causes  of the  consumption  boom.  The 
profiles  by  time  seem  to  have  more  measurement  error, although  the 
data do pick up the aggregate  growth  following  the  1982 recession  and 
the decline  in consumption  growth  in the 1991 recession. 
6.2 IDENTIFYING  THE  EFFECT  OF DEMOGRAPHICS 
In this  section,  each  household's  consumption  and  income  is  decom- 
posed  into a portion  specific  to the time period,  a portion  specific  to its 
birth cohort,  a portion  specific  to its age,  and a final portion  specific  to 
the individual  household.  By defining  the household-specific  portion  to 
have  mean  zero for each age,  cohort,  and time grouping,  the aggregate 
consumption  ratio can be reconstructed  from a weighted  combination  of 
age, time,  and cohort components  for each time period.  Separately iden- 
tifying age, cohort and time effects requires an identifying  assumption.36 
The canonical methodology  for separately identifying  the effects of age, 
cohort,  and time in saving-rate  data is to assume  either that time effects 
are unimportant  or that they have mean zero and are orthogonal  to a time 
trend  (Attanasio,  1997a; Deaton  and  Paxson,  1994).  Income  and  con- 
sumption  are composed  of four additive  effects: a time effect specific  to 
the year the household  is observed;  a cohort effect that captures perma- 
nent  differences  in wealth  and situation;  an age effect that captures  the 
typical household's  saving profile over their life; and finally a household- 
specific  component,  uncorrelated  with  the first three.  In the absence  of 
fluctuations,  the stripped-down  life-cycle model of Modigliani and Brum- 
berg (1956) predicts identical age profiles for each generation  and cohort 
effects  that depend  on lifetime  resources.  Attanasio  (1997a) and Paxson 
(1996) provide  evidence  that age profiles over long time horizons  conform 
reasonably  well  to this model. 
I assume  that the time effects have mean zero and are orthogonal  to a 
linear time trend.  The consumption  increase  can then be traced only  to 
differential saving behavior of different generations  or to different shares 
of the population  at different ages.  While this decomposition  is informa- 
tive without  yielding  a direct structural interpretation,  a simple life-cycle 
35. An alternative approach would  be to average consumption  by year and group first, and 
then  to  first-difference.  But  the  amount  of  noise  in  household-level  consumption 
growth  does  not  seem  to be  sufficient  to require that one  look  only  at consumption 
growth  by group. 
36. Smoothing  the  data using  age  and  cohort  groups  can provide  an artificial identifica- 
tion.  To avoid  this,  all members  of a cohort are assigned  to the same  age,  so that age 
=  year  -  cohort,  and  the  identification  of  the  linear  relationship  among  the  effects 
requires  an identifying  assumption.  The  results,  once  identification  is  imposed,  are 
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model  predicts these  effects.  In the basic life-cycle model,  the household 
consumption  ratio,  C/Y,  can be  written  as the  marginal  propensity  to 
consume  at that age times the household's  wealth: 
Ch  NPVYh  +  Wh +  NTh 




where  NPVY  denotes  the  net  present  value  of  human  wealth,  MPC 
denotes  the propensity  to consume  out of total resources,  h denotes  the 
household  in question,  a denotes  age,  W denotes  financial wealth,  and 
NT denotes  the present  value  of net transfers.  All wealth  measures  are 
as of the start of life. The marginal propensity  to consume  out of wealth 
is allowed  to vary by age, presumably  due to changing  family size,  time 
until  death,  and  possibly  changing  preferences  (or  even  unmodelled 
precautionary  saving). 
Taking logs yields 
Ch  In  = In MPCa + In (NPVYh +  Wh  + NTh) -  In Yh,t. 
Yh 
So that the aggregate  consumption-to-income  ratio can be exactly recon- 
structed  after the decomposition,  I employ  the approximation  ln(Ch/Yh) 
-Sh/Yh  =  Ch/Yh -  1, leading  to 
Ch 
=  Ah  +  Bh +  Th +  h,  (6.2) 
Yh 
where  Ah  1  +  In MPCa  plus  the  sample  average  of  C/Y,  Bh is  the 
average of In (NPVY + W + NT) across households  in the same cohort as 
h less the sample  average,  Th  is the average of -In  Yh,t  across households 
in the same year as h less the sample  average,  and finally  Eh  is that share 
of the  consumption  ratio not explained  by the three effects.  Under  cer- 
tainty, the cohort effect depends  only on lifetime resources.  Fluctuations 
in income  deliver  time effects.  Note  that in estimation,  sampling  error 
falls naturally into a time effect.37 
Before decomposing  the ratio of consumption  to income  as shown  in 
equation  (6.2),  I decompose  household  consumption  into  age,  cohort, 
and time effects.  Household  consumption  is regressed  on a complete  set 
37. The existing models that yield time, age, cohort decompositions maintain the dual 
assumptions  of certainty  and a constant  real interest  rate. 346  PARKER 
of age dummies,  a set of time dummies  less  two,  and a complete  set of 
cohort  dummies  less  one.  Cell weights  are used  in the  regressions  so 
that the relative importance  of a given  cell in generating  the aggregate  is 
accounted  for.  The  regression  constrains  the  coefficients  on  the  time 
dummies  to  sum  to  zero  and  to  be  orthogonal  to  a  time  trend.  The 
coefficients  on the cohort  dummies  are constrained  to have  mean  zero. 
Figure 7a shows  the decomposition  of household-level  consumption. 
The age profile of consumption  rises with  age and declines  less than the 
rough profile of Figure 4. This difference  is due to the cohort effects that 
steadily  increase  over  the  century.  Each  successive  cohort  consumes 
more,  presumably  because  its lifetime  resources  are greater.38 
Figure 7b shows  the same  decomposition  applied  to the consumption 
ratio, as in equation  (6.2). Consumption  and income  are separately  con- 
structed  for each cell of cohort,  age,  and year, and the consumption  rate 
is constructed  for each  cell by dividing  total consumption  by income.39 
The age effects in consumption  ratios show  a typical profile of nondura- 
ble and service  consumption  rates for any generation.  Households  dur- 
ing their working  lives  consume  less  than their incomes,  and a roughly 
constant fraction of income  as they age. As income declines  at age 60 and 
during  retirement,  households  consume  significantly  more  than  their 
incomes.  The implied  saving profile looks quite similar to the predictions 
of the textbook life-cycle  model. 
Turning  next  to  the  cohort  effects,  there  is  clear  evidence  that  the 
younger  cohorts  are bigger  spenders  than the older cohorts,  relative to 
their incomes.  The effect is large, with the cohorts born most recently on 
average consuming  over 15%  more of their income than the oldest house- 
holds.  What causes  such large differences? Within the framework of the 
simple  life-cycle  model  above,  this  higher  level  of consumption  comes 
from younger  cohorts having  higher  wealth  relative  to income,  such  as 
from net government  transfers or bequests. 
The role of increases  in wealth  will be evaluated  shortly. The role of 
intergenerational  transfers is studied  closely  by  Gokhale,  Kotlikoff, and 
Sabelhaus  (1996), who  construct  certainty-equivalent  wealth  levels  in a 
life-cycle  model  and  examine  saving  rates from 1963 to 1989. Their de- 
composition  blames  the declining  national  saving  on government  trans- 
fers  to households  that are elderly  by  1989. If the  pattern  observed  in 
Figure 7b were  due only to intergenerational  transfers, the net transfers 
to the youngest  cohorts would  have  to be larger than those  to the older 
cohorts.  This  is  somewhat  implausible  and  inconsistent  with  the 
38. The rate of increase  of the  cohort  effects  clearly slows  over  time,  consistent  with  the 
slowing  of productivity  growth. 
39. Similar conclusions  are reached  on employing  separate identification  of effects  in con- 
sumption  and income  at the household  level. Spendthrift  in America?  -347 
Figure 7 (a) NONDURABLES-CONSUMPTION  EFFECTS; 
(b) NONDURABLES-CONSUMPTION-TO-INCOME  EFFECTS 
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intergenerational  transfer  distributions  constructed  by  Gokhale, 
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus  (1996). 
In sum,  within  the context  of a basic life-cycle  model,  fiscal transfers 
across generations  alone  cannot  explain  the consumption  boom.  Trans- 
fers may  be  leading  today's  elderly  to consume  a larger share  of their 
incomes  than the elderly  of two  decades  ago.  But social security cannot 
explain  the  propensity  of  cohorts  born  more  recently  to  consume  a 
higher fraction of their incomes  than the current elderly. 
6.3 CAN CHANGING  DEMOGRAPHICS  EXPLAIN  THE 
CONSUMPTION  BOOM? 
This subsection  demonstrates  that the changing  distribution  across age 
groups  in the United  States does  not explain  the increase in the ratio of 
consumption  to income.  According  to the decomposition  of Section 6.2, 
there  are two  possible  explanations  of the  decline  in saving.  First, the 
weight  given  to different  age effects may change  as the shares of differ- 
ent  age  groups  in  the  population  change.  For example,  as  the  elderly 
have  become  an  increasing  share  of  the  population,  they  may  have 
pushed  the  aggregate  saving  rate down  because  the elderly  consume  a 
larger fraction of their incomes  than  other  age groups.  Second,  the  co- 
horts  that  are higher  consumers  may  move  to the  ages  at which  their 
consumption  and  incomes  are higher  and  so  push  up  the  aggregate 
consumption  rate. Lower-consumption  cohorts  may also  die and be re- 
placed by higher-consumption  cohorts. 
This  subsection  uses  the  estimated  effects  to  consider  partial-equili- 
brium alternative scenarios in which different weights  are given to differ- 
ent effects in generating  the aggregate  consumption  ratio. The aggregate 
consumption-to-income  ratio for each year, denoted  (Yt,  can be recon- 
structed as 
\  id wii  A  eIt  i  iw 
Y 
twh ere  i  i  itt wi 
where i indexes age-cohort-year cells, I, is the set of cells for which the 
year is equal to t, wi is the population  weight  associated  with  that cell, Bi 
is the estimated  birth-year or cohort effect, Ti  is the estimated  year effect, 
and Ai is the estimated  age effect. 
Figure  8a  displays  the  reconstructed  consumption-to-income  ratio 
without  cohort effects.40 Figure 8b shows  the consumption  ratio with age 
40. This analysis  is conducted  including  the partial cohorts so as to replicate the aggregate 
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and time removed,  leaving  only the effect of cohorts aging. These figures 
show  that the consumption  boom is not due to the changing  age distribu- 
tion.  Instead,  the  decline  in  saving  occurred  because  each  successive 
generation  consumed  more of its income than the previous  generation  at 
that age.41 
This conclusion  matches  the general consensus  of research in this area 
that the  age  distribution  of the  population  has  little  effect  on  national 
saving  (Bosworth,  Burtless,  and  Sabelhaus,  1991; Paxson,  1996; Atta- 
nasio,  1997a; Deaton,  1997). All of these papers employ  slightly  different 
methodologies  and data, and all blame cohort rather than age effects for 
declining  saving  rates.  Attanasio  (1997a) finds  that those  born between 
1925 and 1939 account for an unusually  high share of national consump- 
tion.  Gokhale,  Kotlikoff,  and  Sabelhaus  (1996) attribute the  decline  in 
saving between  1960 and 1990 to the large share of resources flowing  from 
future generations  to the generation  that is currently elderly.42  The find- 
ings  of the remaining  sections  of the present  paper concur that age dy- 
namics have  little to no effect on the consumption  ratio. 
The balance  of  this  paper  is  devoted  to  a fuller  investigation  of the 
structural  interpretation  of  these  all-important  cohort  effects.  In  this 
section,  the  cohort  effects  represent  differences  in  lifetime  resources, 
because  the  environment  is assumed  so  simple  that no  other  explana- 
tions  are present  to compete.  There  are two  reasons  to be  skeptical  of 
such  a simple  interpretation.  First, the observed  pattern  of fiscal trans- 
fers  is not  consistent  with  the  estimated  pattern  of  the  cohort  effects. 
Second,  there  are  important  observed  changes  in  the  U.S.  economy 
that call into  question  the  simple  identification  scheme  of this  section. 
Differences  in real interest  rates,  shocks  to wealth,  and  different  rates 
of  time  preference  across  generations  all  invalidate  the  identification 
assumptions  employed  here by altering the age profile of consumption 
across households. 
To address  these  shortcomings,  the next section  augments  the simple 
life-cycle  decomposition.  I allow  for uncertainty  and  model  the  cohort 
effect  as  due  both  to  the  permanent  component  of  income  and  to 
wealth  holdings.  Estimating  a linear  approximation  to  the  household 
period than the raw data, which implies that the true cohort  effects for the extremely 
old and young are larger  in absolute  value than the endpoints that are used for them. 
Also, the changing numbers of these households over time induce some year-to-year 
fluctuations  in the reconstructed  ratio  that are not due to time effects. 
41. The same conclusion and similar  pictures  are obtained if instead I separately  remove 
cohort effects from consumption and income at the household-level and reconstruct 
time series without cohort  effects in either series. 
42. They attribute  about  half of the increase  in consumption  to an increasing  propensity  of 
the elderly to consume, a propensity that is not identified as due to age, cohort, or 
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Figure  8 (a) NONDURABLES-CONSUMPTION  RATIO  AND COHORT 
EFFECTS;  (b) NONDURABLES-CONSUMPTION  RATIO  WITHOUT 
TIME  AND AGE  EFFECTS 
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consumption  policy  function,  I again  find  that  the  appreciation  of  as- 
sets alone cannot explain  the consumption  boom. 
7.  The  Role  of Wealth 
This section considers  a realistic but simple model of household  behavior 
and  estimates  an  approximate  consumption  policy  function  for  each Spendthrift  in America?  ?  351 
household.43  The procedure  of this  section  does  not  assume  that time 
effects  have  mean  zero  or that the  agent's  environment  is certain. The 
consumption  boom  is traced to the  changing  age  distribution,  time  ef- 
fects,  and the changing  distributions  of wealth  and the permanent  com- 
ponent  of income. 
7.1 AN ORGANIZING  MODEL 
Each household  in the economy  chooses  consumption  to maximize  ex- 
pected  lifetime utility: 
Max E,s  (  Va,U(t,Ct)+  VT+-sV  rlT+XT+  ) 
t=s 
where  ES  is the expectation  operator conditional  on all information  avail- 
able at time s,  3 is the discount  factor, v shifts utility as households  age, 
F is a family-size  adjustment  that normalizes  consumption  to per capita 
terms,  Xt is household  cash  on  hand,  and  VD() captures  the  possible 
value  of cash  on hand  remaining  at death.  Household  choices  are con- 
strained by an intertemporal budget  constraint that represents the evolu- 
tion of liquid assets  or cash on hand,  Xt, and a liquidity  constraint  that 
they must maintain positive  net wealth: 
Xtl  =  Rt+(Xt  -  C)  +  (1  -  T) Yt+l, 
Xt  Ct, 
where  Rt+1  is the gross after-tax rate of return on the household's  optimal 
portfolio,  and Yt is disposable  nonasset,  pretax income. 
The household  bases  its  consumption  upon  its  current  state  and  its 
expectations  about  the  future.  That is,  household  consumption  is  de- 
scribed by  an optimal  policy  function  of the  payoff-relevant  state vari- 
ables.  In order to choose  its current consumption  level,  the household 
needs  to know  its current and expected  future resources,  its family size, 
the time horizon  over which  it is alive, and the possible  investments  and 
rates of return available to it. In order to forecast future income,  I assume 
that  the  household  only  requires  the  permanent  component  of  its  in- 
come,  Ph, the aggregate  state, At, and its age.44 I assume  that the house- 
hold  requires  only  knowledge  of the  aggregate  state  to forecast  future 
rates of return optimally. 
Under  these  assumptions,  the consumption  function  for household  h 
43. Recent work  that estimates  consumption  functions  includes  Carroll (1994) and Parker 
(1998). 
44. The permanent  component  will be defined  shortly. I will also consider  a case in which 
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can be written  solely  as a function  of family size,  wealth,  income,  age, 
the permanent  component  of income,  and the aggregate  state. 
Ch =  F(Fh, Xh, ageh,  Ph, A,).  (7.1) 
Since different cohorts may still have different preferences  for consump- 
tion  above  and  beyond  their state  variables,  and  since  there  may  be  a 
role for different  intergenerational  transfers by cohort,  the exclusion  of 
birth year from the consumption  function  is tested. 
7.2 ESTIMATION  STRATEGY 
A  log-linear  approximation  to  the  policy  function  is  estimated  in  the 
form 
In Ch =  g(Fh)  +  h(Xh) + f(ageh)  +  B In Ph +  T, +  Eh,  (7.2) 
where  the  residual  represents  measurement  error in  the  level  of  con- 
sumption,  and Tt  is a year effect that captures the aggregate state, that is, 
changing  expectations  about  the  future.  This  equation  is estimated  on 
the PSID data in 1984, 1989, and 1994, the years in which,  as previously 
discussed,  the PSID has an accurate reporting of household  wealth.  The 
data  are constructed  from  the  PSID data  already  employed,  with  the 
addition  of these three years' wealth  supplements  and the following  two 
constructions. 
First, I construct a measure of consumption  in 1989, a year in which the 
PSID does not report food consumption.  Consumption  from 1990 is used 
instead  and deflated  for each household  by the aggregate  growth  in con- 
sumption  between  1989 and 1990. Since any innovation  to marginal utility 
between  1989 and 1990 should  not be predictable by anything  known  in 
1989 (such as what  is on the right-hand  side of the 1989 regression),  this 
substitution  should  not adversely  affect the results.  Second,  I construct 
the permanent  component  of income  as the forecast of the log of current 
income  from two  lags  of the log  of family income,  education,  and age- 
group dummy  variables.  This forecast is done  separately  for retired and 
nonretired  households.  Note that to the extent that permanent  income is 
mismeasured,  some  of its effect  on  consumption  will be  picked  up by 
correlated variables such as wealth.  Given a positive  correlation between 
true permanent  income and wealth,  such mismeasurement  would  lead to 
an exaggeration  of the impact of wealth  on consumption. 
The function g(Fh) consists  of the size of the family and the number of 
children  in the family. A set  of dummy  variables  representing  the five- 
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nally,  wealth  is included  in the  regressions  as the  log  of wealth  if it is 
positive,  a dummy  for wealth  being  zero or negative,  and a dummy  for 
whether  the household  has a pension. 
How  does  this model  differ from the age-time-cohort  decomposition 
of the  previous  section?  The key  differences  are two.  First, the  model 
includes directly both wealth and the permanent component  of income in 
place of the cohort effect of the previous section. The behavior of consump- 
tion can then be traced both to this observable version  of the cohort effect 
and to time effects and omitted elements  of the cohort effect. Second,  the 
time effects are not constrained  to be orthogonal  to a linear trend. Thus 
they can explain trend movements  in consumption  that are not explained 
by increases  in wealth,  the changing  age distribution,  and so forth. 
Equation (7.2) is estimated  on the entire sample  of weighted  data with 
imputed  real nondurable  and  services  consumption  as  the  dependent 
variable. The time effects capture expectations,  real interest rates, and all 
aggregate  conditions.  The only source of variation is cross-sectional.  The 
goal  of the  exercise  is to see  whether  the behavioral  relationships  esti- 
mated  from household  data can explain  the  consumption  boom  when 
time-series  variation is substituted  for cross-sectional  variation. 
7.3 BEHAVIORAL  EVIDENCE  ON THE  CONSUMPTION  BOOM 
Table 3 displays  the results  of estimation  of four different  specifications 
and  the  implied  increases  in  the  ratio  of  consumption  to  income  due 
only to changes  in the distribution  of wealth  to income over the period.45 
The marginal propensity  to consume  out of wealth  is estimated  to be 
around  4%. As noted  in Section  3, ignoring  timing,  a marginal propen- 
sity  to consume  out  of wealth  of 9% can rationalize  the  entire 20-year 
consumption  boom.  Over  the  10-year period  being  studied  here,  how- 
ever, wealth  increased  in relation  to income  only  over the first 5 years; 
during  the second  5 years the distribution  of wealth  spread out,  so that 
the  number  of low-wealth  households  increased  despite  no  significant 
change  in the mean wealth-to-income  ratio. 
The  estimated  relationship  between  consumption  and  wealth  is not 
linear, in that the cluster of low-wealth  households  have more consump- 
tion  than  would  be  implied  by  the  relationship  between  wealth  and 
consumption  for higher-wealth  households.  The PSID does not measure 
pension  wealth,  but the presence  of a pension  increases  consumption  by 
between  21%  and 5%. 
When  interpreting  the income  variables-the  current income  and the 
45. See  Hurst,  Luoh,  and  Stafford  (1998) for a detailed  description  and  analysis  of  the 
distribution of wealth  in the PSID. See also Sabelhaus and Pence (1998) on the changing 
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Table  3  CONSUMPTION-FUNCTION  REGRESSIONS 
Regression  1  2  3  4 
Log of wealth (if not low)  0.048  0.039  0.045  0.036 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Low wealth  0.330  0.267  0.301  0.248 
(0.025)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Expected  log income  0.314  0.175  0.309  0.172 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Pension  0.049  0.028  0.047  0.027 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Log income  0.161  0.160 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
Stockholder  0.041  0.028 
(0.008)  (0.007) 
Year  1989  0.030  0.030  0.028  0.029 
(0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Year  1994  0.053  0.059  0.048  0.056 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Number of observations  11,903  11,903  11,901  11,901 
R2  0.583  0.623  0.584  0.624 
Significance  level for birth  0.953  0.908  0.955  0.909 
year 
Implied increase  in C/Y 
due to increase in W/Y: 
1984-89  0.011  0.009  0.010  0.008 
1989-94  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Total  increase  in C/Y 
1984-89  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.025 
1989-94  0.030  0.030  0.030  0.030 
Regressions  also include  family  size and the number  of children  in the household  and a complete  set of 
age-group  effects.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
permanent-component  or  expected  income-one  must  keep  in  mind 
that the  time  effects  remove  mean  long-run  correlations.  That is,  if the 
model  were identified  from the time dimension,  then rising incomes  and 
consumption  together  with  the  budget  constraint  would  impose  a 
cointegrating  relationship.  This is not the case in cross-sectional  data, a 
point  made  famously  by  Milton  Friedman.  Even  looking  at predicted Spendthrift  in America?  ?  355 
income,  the coefficient  is far from unity, suggesting  only a 30% increase 
in consumption  with  income.46 
The  increase  in  wealth-to-income  ratio  explains,  again  in  a partial- 
equilibrium  sense,  about a fifth of the increase in the ratio of consump- 
tion to income over the period.  The implied  increase in consumption  due 
to  the  changes  in wealth-to-income  ratio is  calculated  as  follows.  The 
consumption-to-income  ratio  that  actually  occurred  is  compared  with 
the consumption-to-income  ratio calculated  from the estimated  parame- 
ters and an unchanging  distribution  of wealth-to-income  ratio.47  By esti- 
mating  the  consumption  function  rather than  looking  for evidence  in 
Euler equations  or contemporaneous  relationships,  this analysis  exploits 
the long-term  relationships  between  the variables. Thus it finds a signifi- 
cant effect of stock-market activity on consumption,  where many studies 
before,  focusing  on high-frequency  data, have  found  little relation.48 
In addition to a role for wealth,  the regressions  in Table 3 find a signifi- 
cant role for both  time  and birth-year effects.  First, the  majority of the 
increase  in the ratio of consumption  to income  is due  to time  effects.49 
This  is consistent  with  the  optimism  explanation  for the  consumption 
boom,  in which  households  believe  that future output  less  government 
consumption  will  rise  significantly.  However,  the  null  hypothesis  that 
birth year does not belong  in the regression  model  is rejected at the 10% 
level across all specifications.  Thus, the wealth variable is not sufficient to 
capture all the cohort effects that are present in the data. The large share 
of the decline  in saving  that cannot be explained  by the wealth  distribu- 
tion is instead explained by some combination  of time effects and unmod- 
eled  cohort effects.  We can conclude  that neither the increase in wealth 
nor the changing  distribution  of the population  can fully account for the 
consumption  boom. 
The third and fourth regressions  investigate  the role of stock-market 
participation.  If some households  are exogenously  barred from investing 
in the stock market, then the consumption  of households  that are in the 
market should  be higher  than that of those  that are out  of the market, 
given  the  value  of the  set  of  state  variables  for that household.50  This 
46. It is most likely that this signals persistence but not permanence in the expected/ 
permanent  component of income. 
47. The change in the log of wealth less the change  in the log of income is multiplied  by the 
estimated coefficient  on the log of wealth and added to the change in the fraction  of 
low-wealth households times the coefficient  on low wealth. 
48. See Poterba and Samwick (1995), Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), and the citation 
therein. 
49. Changes in the age distribution  contribute  a small decrease in the consumption-to- 
income ratio. 
50. The household that is not excluded can always mimic the excluded  household and do 
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might be the case if, for example,  poor households  do not find it worth- 
while  to pay a fixed cost that is required for access to the stock market.51 
Table 3 estimates  that the benefits  to participation are quite small, on the 
order of 3-4%  of consumption.  Given  that the  share  of households  in 
the  stock  market  has  risen  by  about  10% over  the  period  studied,  a 
partial-equilibrium  model  would  predict a -% rise in consumption  from 
increased  stock-market  participation.  Of course,  in general equilibrium, 
prices  respond.  The increased  participation  affects  asset  prices  and  so 
the wealth  of those  already in the market; the expectation  of entering the 
market has effects  on those  not in the market; and in addition,  endoge- 
nous  changes  in the capital stock affect all workers.  From this analysis, 
one  can only  conclude  that there  are small  but  significant  increases  in 
consumption  from stock-market participation above and beyond  wealth- 
holding,  income,  age,  and the aggregate  state. 
In sum,  this section  finds a significant  but small role for the apprecia- 
tion  of  assets  in  the  consumption  boom:  the  increase  in  wealth  that 
occurred from 1984 to 1994 increased  the consumption  ratio by one-fifth 
of its overall increase.  The remaining  causes  of the consumption  boom 
are due to other time and cohort effects,  but not due to the changing  age 
distribution  of the population. 
The next  section  studies  the growth  rate of consumption  and models 
all time effects as due to the real interest rate or shocks  to wealth. 
8.  Consumption  Growth:  Impatient  Generations,  Wealth 
Increases,  and  Intertemporal  Substitution 
This section analyzes  the growth rate of consumption  instead of its level. 
The advantages  of this approach are threefold.  First, the real interest rate 
and thus intertemporal substitution  is modelled  structurally. Second,  the 
growth  rate of  consumption  is related  to wealth  measures  in order to 
evaluate  whether  unexpectedly  high  asset  returns  are the  cause  of the 
consumption  boom.  If a series  of  unexpectedly  high  stock-market  re- 
turns  have  increased  consumption  significantly,  the  households  that 
own  stocks  should  have  significantly  higher  consumption  growth  than 
those  that  do  not.  Third,  the  role  of some  preference  heterogeneity  is 
modelled  by allowing  different cohorts to have different discount  rates.52 
To preview  the  findings,  there  is no  evidence  uncovered  that wealthy 
51. See Vissing-Jorgensen  (1998). 
52. In the  levels  analysis,  if discount  rates were  heterogeneous,  then  the  age  profiles  of 
consumption  would  vary with cohort and this variation would  undermine  the identifi- 
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households  had  faster  consumption  growth  or  that  younger  cohorts 
have higher  discount  rates. 
Analysis  of growth  rates cannot replace examination  of consumption 
levels  for two reasons.  First, growth  rates of consumption  at the house- 
hold  level  are extremely  variable,  which  weakens  statistical  inference. 
Second,  household  transitions like divorce, marriage, death,  and leaving 
home  imply  that  the  analysis  misses  significant  parts  of  consumption 
growth.  For example,  if young  cohorts  start life with high  consumption 
and then have consumption  growth  over their lives that is similar to that 
of older cohorts,  consumption  growth  aggregated  from household  con- 
sumption  growth will show no consumption  boom or cohort heterogene- 
ity. The level  and the growth-rate  analyses  are complementary. 
Before presenting  the  analysis,  it is important  to note  that there  is a 
consumption  boom  in  the  first-differenced  data.53 However,  for  the 
analysis  of  consumption  growth  rates,  a modified  method  is  used  to 
impute  consumption  in  the  PSID,  as described  in the  Appendix.  This 
imputation  assigns  NIPA consumption  so that the aggregated  household 
data match NIPA growth in real per capita consumption.  The imputation 
does  not  alter  the  cross-sectional  pattern  of  consumption  growth,  so 
that, for example,  if stockholders  have  faster consumption  growth  than 
nonstockholders  over the period,  this will still be detected.  This imputa- 
tion  mainly  smooths  out  the  swings  in growth  that occur from year to 
year due to sampling  and measurement  error. 
The expected  real interest rate is constructed  from the after-tax nomi- 
nal  return  on  a six-year  Treasury bill  during  the  calendar  year  of  the 
interview  less  the inflation  rate calculated  from the chained  deflator for 
nondurable  goods  and services that is used to deflate the rest of the data. 
The  marginal  tax  rate  is  taken  from  Stephenson  (1998)  (the  series 
AMEITRPI).54  The expectation  is taken by predicting  the real interest rate 
for  year  t  (to  be  used  as  the  return  between  t  and  t  +  1) using  the 
following  variables:  the  once  lagged  second-quarter  to  second-quarter 
growth  rate in national  income;  the  twice  lagged  after-tax real interest 
rate; the  once  and  twice  lagged  annual  unemployment  rate for white 
males 20 years of age and older.55 The predicting  equation  is run for the 
period  1962 to 1997. 
Finally, two  steps  are taken to minimize  the effect of the high level  of 
53. See Appendix  (Figure 10) and Figure 6b. 
54. Using  the  real return on  high-grade  municipals  which  are tax-free leads  to the  same 
conclusions  throughout,  since  the  expected  returns of these  annual  series  are highly 
correlated. 
55. The consumption  data in the PSID refer to a specific point in time, and are not averages 
over a calendar year, although  there is some  debate  on this point  (see the appendix  of 
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noise  in  consumption  growth  data.56 First,  the  groupings  of  age  and 
cohort  are  expanded  to  ten-year  groups.  The  noise  in  consumption 
growth  makes the identification  of age and cohort groups more difficult, 
and  the  five-year  groups  were  substantially  noisier.57 Second,  changes 
greater than 75% in absolute  value  are dropped. 
Identification  is  slightly  simpler  in  the  growth-rate  regressions.  In 
theory,  the  innovations  in the  Euler equation  have  mean  zero  and  are 
not  predictable  by  the  other right-hand-side  variables.  In other words, 
the real interest  rate captures  all time  effects  that are not  orthogonal  to 
cohort and age effects and to the real interest rate. 
However,  one  of the main  explanations  of the consumption  boom  is 
that there has been  a sequence  of positive  shocks  to wealth.  Thus,  as a 
second  assumption,  time  effects  aside  from the real interest  rate are al- 
lowed  to differ by household  wealthholding  patterns.  That is, the weak- 
ness  of the first assumption  is that innovations  to wealth  might be corre- 
lated with predictable movements  in the real interest rate in a short panel 
of data. Suppose  that the period  from 1984 to 1994 experienced  a run of 
innovations  to wealth,  due to unexpectedly  strong stock-market growth. 
There would  be increases in consumption  over the period that would  not 
have mean zero after removing  the substitution  effect due to movements 
in  the  real  interest  rate.  The  coefficients  on  the  remaining  regressors 
would  suffer  from  a small-sample  bias.  To allow  for this  possibility,  I 
identify  the  trend in cohort  and  age effects  of all households  using  the 
nonstockholders  or low-wealth  households  according to the first identify- 
ing  assumption,  and  then  allow  the time effects  or trend  consumption 
growth  rate of stockholders  or high-wealth  households  to be different. 
This is done  by adding  a dummy  variable for stockholding  or the log of 
wealth to the Euler equation to capture the mean of the expectation  errors 
for these  households  in sample. 
Table 4  shows  the  results  of  estimating  the  following  consumption 
Euler equation.58 
A  In Ch,t+l 
- 
oEt[rt+1] +  ageh,t +  cohorth,t  +  ' h,t+l, 
where  a is the  intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution.  The regressions 
explain just over 1% of the variation of household  consumption  growth. 
56. The same  set  of regressions  are run in grouped  data, since  the measurement  error is 
reduced  by  averaging,  but  exogenous  variation  is  also  averaged  and  the  results  are 
quite similar to those  presented  here. 
57. Put  another  way,  the  groupings  are informally  imposing  a smoothness  prior on  the 
data.  Large  amounts  of  variation  across  neighboring  groups  suggest  insufficient 
smoothing. 
58. Estimation  employs  two-stage  least  squares,  and  reported  standard  errors allow  for 
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Table  4  CONSUMPTION  GROWTH  REGRESSIONS 
Regression  1  2  3 
Expected  real interest rate 
Cohort <09 
Cohort 10-19 
Cohort  20-29 
Cohort  30-39 
Cohort  40-49 
Cohort  50-59 




























































Dependent  variable  is the first  difference  of log consumption.  Regressions  also include  a complete  set of 
age-group  effects.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
The first column  of Table 4 presents  the regression  results for a standard 
Euler equation. 
The first result of interest is that the intertemporal elasticity of substitu- 
tion is estimated  as 0.7. Typical estimates in the literature are significantly 
lower  and sometimes  zero.59 This estimate  is in line with  Attanasio  and 
Weber (1995), who used grouped  CEX data to study Euler equations over 
the same  period.  The reasons  for this finding  here are three.  First, con- 
sumption  of nondurable  goods  and services typically has a higher elastic- 
ity  than  food.  Second,  the  data are annual.  If seasonal  fluctuations  in 
consumption  and the real interest rate are to some extent driven by prefer- 
ences,  this  confounds  inference.  Finally, for the  decade  covered  by the 
59. See the discussion  in Deaton  (1992). 360 *  PARKER 
Figure 9 INTEREST  RATES AND  GROWTH IN REAL CONSUMPTION  PER 
CAPITA 
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household  data, consumption  growth  and the expected  real interest rate 
are highly  correlated. 
Figure 9 displays  the expected  real interest rate and the growth  rate of 
real consumption  per capita. Over the past twenty  years, the changes  in 
the growth rate of consumption  can be rationalized  by movements  in the 
expected  real interest rate assuming  an intertemporal  elasticity of substi- 
tution  near unity. As to explaining  the consumption  boom,  one  can ask 
to  what  extent  consumption  growth  would  have  been  slower  had  a 
lower  real interest  rate been  in effect.60 The expected  real interest  rate 
from 1980 to 1994 averaged  1.5%. During the last five years the expected 
rate  has  averaged  just  over  1%. Given  the  estimated  elasticity  of  in- 
tertemporal  substitution,  consumption  growth  would  have  been  0.35% 
per year slower  had  this lower  interest  rate been  in effect.  Over  the  15 
years  of data on which  the  coefficient  is estimated,  consumption  grew 
5.5  percentage  points  more  than  income,  and  this  alternative  scenario 
generates  nearly exactly that excess. 
60. There would of course be an associated jump in consumption with an announced 
different  path of interest rates, so this counterfactual  is asking whether the observed 
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There are three main problems  with  explaining  the decline  in saving 
solely  by intertemporal  substitution.  First, the nice fit of the Euler equa- 
tion,  observed  roughly  since Hall (1978) pointed  the equation  out, is not 
evident  in  the  earlier  data.61 Expected  income  growth  may  be  partly 
generating  this high  estimate  of the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitu- 
tion during the consumption  boom.  During the 1980s and 1990s, there is 
a strong correlation between  expected  income  growth  and the expected 
real interest  rate.62 Second,  from  1960 to  1979,  the  real rate of  return 
averaged  0.02%, and as shown  in Table 1, the  growth  rate of real con- 
sumption  per  capita  averaged  2.5%.  That is,  across  the  decades,  high 
real interest rates are correlated with  low  rates of consumption  growth. 
Finally, it is difficult to take seriously  a story in which  almost none  of the 
movements  of  consumption  over  14 years  are driven  by  changes  that 
represent new  information  to households. 
Despite  this skepticism,  it is important  to note  that the consumption 
and real-interest-rate  data are consistent  with  the impulse  response  of a 
shock to household  propensity  to consume  in the early 1980s. 
Turning  to  the  hypothesis  that  different  cohorts  have  different  dis- 
count rates, Table 4 demonstrates  that the cohort effects on consumption 
growth are small and not significantly  different from one another. While 
the  standard  errors are large,  even  in the  point  estimates,  there  is not 
evidence  of  greater  impatience  in  younger  cohorts.  It is worth  noting 
that the  mean  of the  cohort  dummies  is not  separately  identified  from 
the mean  of age effects.  Thus  one  cannot  construct  a hypothetical  con- 
sumption  path  along  the lines  of Figure 8 without  some  further restric- 
tions  on the data. 
The  second  and  third  columns  of  Table 4  show  that  consumption 
growth  is  not  significantly  higher  for high-wealth  households,  home- 
owners,  stockholders,  or households  with  pensions.63 Wealth is statisti- 
cally insignificant  in the last column,  and the magnitude  of the effect is 
small,  suggesting  a 0.1% lower  rate of consumption  growth  for a dou- 
bling of wealth.64 
61. The  usual  citations  are  Hansen  and  Singleton  (1983),  Hall  (1988),  Campbell  and 
Mankiw  (1989), and Blinder and Deaton  (1985). 
62. Janice Eberly and John Campbell both suggested  that I include expected  income growth 
in the  consumption-growth  regressions.  Doing  so  does  give  a statistically  significant 
role for expected  income  growth,  but  it is economically  small  and  does  not  alter the 
coefficient  on the expected  real interest  rate. Given  the imputations  made,  this is not 
quite  a fair test  of the  role of expected  income,  but  there  are many  in the  literature. 
63. In regressions  using  wealth  data that are only  available  in  1984, 1989, and  1994, the 
most  recent  predetermined  value  is  used.  When  this  is  not  available,  1984 data  are 
used.  Dropping  all changes  prior to 1984-1985  leads to the same conclusions. 
64. While  not  consistent  with  the  wealthy  having  more  positive  innovations  to the  mar- 
ginal utility of wealth  over this period,  the result is consistent  with the wealthy  having 
lower precautionary  saving  motives. 362  PARKER 
One  possible  reason  for the insignificant  results  in these  growth-rate 
regressions  is the presence  of large amounts  of measurement  error in the 
growth  rate of consumption.  One  solution,  which  comes  at the cost of a 
representative  sample,  is to regress  the  growth  of consumption  in the 
five years following  a wealth  survey  on the initial wealth  levels  and time 
effects  and household  characteristics  such  as family  size  and  age,  as is 
done  for levels  in the previous  section.  Doing  this  confirms  two  of the 
three  main  implications  of  the  growth-rate  regressions.  First,  cohorts 
cannot be ignored  even  after conditioning  on the wealth  characteristics 
of households,  although  it is still not possible  to identify  a clear pattern 
of differing  discount  rates across cohorts.  Second,  the wealthy  are again 
found  to have slightly  lower  consumption  growth  over this period.  The 
final  main  point,  which  cannot  be  meaningfully  confirmed  with  only 
two  observations  on consumption  growth,  is that consumption  growth 
and the real interest rate move  in lockstep. 
In  sum,  how  does  the  analysis  of  growth  rates  inform  what  was 
learned  in the levels  analysis?  The real interest  rate may have  played  a 
role, but only  as it propagates  a positive  shock to the desire to consume 
out  of  output  in  the  early  1980s.  We  still  find  no  evidence  that  the 
consumption  boom  is due to wealth  appreciation. 
9 Conclusion 
This paper is motivated  by a striking increase in the share of U.S. output 
that is consumed.  This increase has occurred concurrently  with a reduc- 
tion  in the  growth  rate of consumption  per capita,  a high  real interest 
rate, and an increasing  ratio of wealth  to income.  In a search for clues, 
the paper uses  a dataset of household  consumption,  income,  and wealth 
to  decompose  the  consumption  boom  and  confirm  or  reject possible 
culprits. 
This analysis  leads  to several  conclusions  about the large increase  in 
the consumption  share of output  and the decline  in the U.S. saving  rate. 
First, a thorough  examination  of  NIPA data  shows  that  households 
and governments  in the United  States are consuming  a greater share of 
output  than  twenty  years  ago.  Second,  this  increase  is not  due  to the 
changing  age distribution  of the U.S.  population. 
Third, only  one-fifth  of the increase in consumption  to income  can be 
explained  by changes  in the ratio of household  wealth  to income.  While 
the  wealth-to-income  ratio  has  risen,  it  has  done  so  primarily  after 
the increase in the consumption  share of output. The national saving rate 
has actually risen coincident with the stock-market boom of the late 1990s. 
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hold  data  cannot  rationalize  the  consumption  boom.  The  increases  in 
consumption-to-income  ratios across groups  are not related to the distri- 
bution of wealth, homeownership,  or pension  participation.  While surely 
they have a role, shocks to asset values are not the main force driving the 
relative increase in consumption. 
Fourth,  prime  candidates  for explaining  the  consumption  boom  are 
factors  that  increase  the  effective  discount  rate  of  the  representative 
agent. During this period of rising consumption  share, the growth rate of 
real consumption  per capita has  fallen.  At the  same  time,  real interest 
rates have been relatively high.  These two facts together  imply a driving 
force that has increased actual or effective  discount  rates. It is also worth 
noting that there is a strong correlation between  the real interest rate and 
consumption  growth within the period of consumption  boom. That is, the 
aggregate  consumption  Euler equation  provides  a better description  of 
the data during this period than in previous  periods. 
This paper considers  several explanations  that can generate this effec- 
tive impatience.  The analysis  reveals no evidence  that the growth rate of 
consumption,  and thus  the discount  rate, is higher  for younger  house- 
holds.  Further, inconsistent  with  an explanation  that relies  only  on in- 
tergenerational  government  transfers,  younger  cohorts  have  a higher 
ratio of consumption  to income than older cohorts. Finally, relaxed liquid- 
ity constraints  could  lead  to an increase  in debt  and  consumption.  But 
the  total increase  in debt  relative  to income  over  the past  two  decades 
only amounts  to one-third  of the value  of the consumption  boom. 
While we do not yet have a clear answer to what has caused the recent 
decline  in  saving,  some  speculation  is  possible  based  on  the  concrete 
findings  of this paper. 
Given  that  consumption  is  a  forward-looking  variable,  households 
may be learning  about high levels  of output  in the future. This explana- 
tion is untestable,  and twenty  years is a long consumption  boom without 
yet  seeing  a shift  to higher  output  growth.  However,  given  that other 
explanations  have  come  up  short,  this  possibility  gains  credence.  The 
strength  of this explanation  is that we  do observe  some  signals  of high 
future growth rates, such as the increase in stock prices; the weakness  is 
that without  quite  a run of negative  expectational  errors, this  explana- 
tion cannot match the slowdown  in consumption  growth. 
A second  candidate  is that rather than being driven by technology  or a 
force external to U.S.  households,  the decline  in saving  is due to a shift 
in the preferences  of the typical household.  This explanation  is as hard 
to evaluate  as the optimism  explanation  just discussed;  however,  it can 
fit the facts uncovered  here. 
A  final  explanation  consistent  with  the  findings  of  this  paper  is  a 364 *  PARKER 
combination  of factors that work  to increase  the consumption  of differ- 
ent generations.  Perhaps  federal transfers in the form of social  security 
and  Medicare  are increasing  the  consumption  of the  elderly,  while  re- 
laxed  liquidity  constraints  are allowing  the young  to consume  more  of 
their incomes.  This explanation  can match the cross-cohort effects on the 
consumption-to-income  ratio found  in Section  6,  the  high  real interest 
rate, and the slowdown  in consumption  growth; however,  it is inconsis- 
tent with  the stock-market boom. 
There are many  theories  that can explain  an increase in the consump- 
tion  of aggregate  output.  This paper  shows  that the  main  monocausal 
explanations  fail to  match  the  household  behavior  or macroeconomic 
outcomes  observed  during  the decline  in U.S.  saving  over the past two 
decades.  More importantly,  we  have  an increasing  number  of facts that 
new  theories  or combinations  of theories  must fit. 
Appendix.  The  Household  Data 
A.1 THE  PANEL  STUDY  OF INCOME  DYNAMICS 
The main relevant  features  of the PSID are described  in the body  of the 
paper. Several remaining  issues  are noted  here. 
To  ensure  that  the  sample  is  nationally  representative,  the  over- 
sampled  Latino subsample  is excluded  from analysis. 
Figure  10 demonstrates  that  the  ratio  of  total  household  food  con- 
sumption  to total household  income  in the PSID matches  well  the time- 
series  pattern of the ratio of total food  consumption  to national  income 
in  the  NIPA  data.  The  PSID  ratio  is  persistently  lower  by  about  22% 
of income.  This  is because  food  consumption  in  the  national  accounts 
includes  food  purchases  by  employers  and  the  government,  because 
income  in the  PSID includes  transfers,  and because  the PSID seems  to 
underestimate  total  food  consumption  expenditures  by  households. 
This claim is verified by comparing  the amounts  inferred from the PSID 
and from the CEX. 
The  PSID  total-wealth-to-income  ratio  matches  the  net-worth-to- 
income  ratio in the flow-of-funds  data well.  Both ratios rise significantly 
from 1984 to 1989 and are roughly  the same in 1989 and 1994. 
A.2 THE  CONSUMER  EXPENDITURE  SURVEY 
This section  evaluates  the relevant  features of the CEX data. In order to 
perform the imputation  procedure,  a household's  consumption  must be 
allocated to a quarter, and to evaluate the quality of the data, it must also 
be  allocated  to  a year.  A  household's  reported  consumption  expendi- Spendthrift  in America?  ?  365 
Figure  10 FOOD-CONSUMPTION-TO-INCOME  RATIOS 
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tures are allocated  to the calendar quarter closest  to the midpoint  of the 
year covered by interviews.  Annual data are constructed  for graphing by 
using  the average of all quarters in that year. 
Figure 10 shows  that the ratio of food  consumption  to income  in the 
CEX declines  slightly  more and has a slightly  lower correlation with  the 
NIPA series than the PSID series does. In fact, this large decline in the CEX 
is symptomatic  of a poor correlation between  the ratio of total consump- 
tion to income in the CEX and that in the NIPA. While this difference is in 
part due to increasing purchases  of medical care by the government,  it is 
also due to an increasing difficulty for the BLS  in measuring certain catego- 
ries of household  consumption  expenditures.  It turns out that this does 
not create an insurmountable  difficulty for the analysis.  Instead of taking 
imputed  consumption  expenditures  as  the  truth,  two  adjustments  are 
made so as to allocate NIPA consumption  and medical care in relation to 
imputed  household  consumption.  Gokhale,  Kotlikoff,  and  Sabelhaus 
(1996) use the CEX in a similar manner to allocate national accounts con- 
sumption  across age groups  in each year. In addition,  since  the CEX is 
used to scale up food consumption  in the PSID, the ratio of total nondura- 
bles and services consumption  to total consumption,  rather than the ratio 
of consumption  to income is the relevant series. The ratios of nondurables 
and  services  consumption  to food  consumption  in the  CEX and  NIPA 
track each other reasonably  well,  with the exception  of changes between 
1980 and  1982 (when  the CEX improved  its survey  instrument  for con- 
sumption)  and between  1986 and 1988. 366  PARKER 
A.3 THE  CREATION  OF NONDURABLE  AND SERVICES 
CONSUMPTION  IN THE  PSID 
The details  of the regressors  in the consumption  imputation  procedures 
are as follows.  The main regression  employs  a log-log  specification  with 
a  cubic  polynomial  of  the  log  of  food  consumption.  Since  there  are 
possibly  different returns to scale in the household  consumption  of food 
and other items,  the variables allowed  to shift preferences  include  nine 
family size dummies  for household  sizes  1 through 9 or more. The impu- 
tation  also  includes  dummies  for  whether  the  household  head  has  a 
high-school  degree  or less  education,  some  college,  or a college  degree 
or more education.  To account for shifting  preferences  across ages,  I also 
include  a fifth-order polynomial  in age for households  less  than age 65 
and a second-order  polynomial  in age for households  greater than 65. To 
allow  for labor-supply  interactions,  the preference  shifters include  a re- 
tirement dummy  variable, a dummy  variable for whether  the household 
is retired and younger  than 65, and dummies  for whether  there are zero, 
one,  or two  or more earners.  Finally, to capture both prices  and prefer- 
ences,  a set of quarter dummies  and a set of year dummies  are included. 
The four steps  of the imputation  are as follows. 
First, using the CEX data, the log of nondurable  and services consump- 
tion is regressed on a cubic polynomial  in the log of food consumption  and 
the remaining regressors just discussed.  The CEX regression  using 37,730 
households  explains  80% of  the  variation  in household  consumption, 
although  the typical  error is 30% of nondurable  and services  consump- 
tion.  The coefficients  are not reported  but are reasonable.  A household 
with  a college-educated  head  consumes  15% percent  more nondurables 
and services relative to food than a household  with a head without  a high- 
school  degree.  Retired households  consume  10% more nondurables  and 
services  relative to food than a nonretired  household. 
Second,  the estimated  equation is used with the same set of regressors 
in the  PSID to predict  nondurables  and  services  consumption  for each 
household.  The number  of earners in the PSID is calculated from reports 
on labor income  and wages  of head  and spouse.  The quarter dummy  is 
set  equal  to the  second  quarter, since  most  PSID households  are inter- 
viewed  in  May. Similarly, the  year  dummy  for 1979 is  set  equal  to  its 
value  for 1980, and the year dummy  for 1994 is set equal to its value  for 
1993. Constructing  the  implied  consumption-to-income  ratio from  the 
imputed  data gives  a highly  volatile  series.  This said,  the average  ratio 
for the first four years is 0.057 below  the average for the last four, show- 
ing a reasonably  good  mapping  to the aggregate  trend. 
Third,  the  imputed  consumption  for each  household  is  treated  as a 
relative  consumption  level,  and  the  total  consumption  across  house- Spendthrift  in America?  *  367 
holds  is  scaled  up  to  include  medical  purchases  by  the  government. 
Medical care purchased  by the government,  except for Medicare, is allo- 
cated in proportion  to total consumption  across all households  that are 
younger  than 65 by year. This adjusts consumption  of these  households 
upwards  by  1.5% to 2.5% of total consumption  over  the entire sample. 
Medicare expenditures  are allocated  evenly  across all households  age 65 
or older in a similar manner, which  leads  to a scale factor that grows by 
10 percentage  points  over  the  sample.  The elderly  account  on  average 
for 11% of total imputed  consumption.  Medicare purchases  by the gov- 
ernment  rise from 1.6% to 3.2% of total consumption  expenditures  less 
government  spending  on health care. Without this adjustment,  the con- 
sumption  of the  elderly  would  be  significantly  understated  and,  more 
importantly,  the  rise  in  their  consumption  would  be  understated.  In- 
come  is  not  adjusted  for  this  consumption  that  is  purchased  by  the 
government  for households.  Interpretation  of  cohort  and  age  profiles 
throughout  the paper keeps  this in mind. 
Fourth,  the  consumption  of  nondurable  goods  and  services  in  the 
NIPA in each year is allocated  across households  in proportion  to each 
household's  consumption  from  the  third  step.  The  allocation  is  con- 
ducted  so  that  the  consumption-to-income  ratio  in  the  micro  data 
matches  that in the NIPA in every year. 
When  working  with  the  growth  rate of consumption,  the  following 
modification  to the imputation  procedure  is made.  Instead of using  the 
level  of predicted  consumption  in the PSID to allocate  NIPA consump- 
tion expenditures,  the level is used  only to allocate medical purchases  by 
the government.  In the fourth step of the imputation,  the growth  rate of 
NIPA real consumption  per capita is allocated  across households  in ac- 
cord  with  their household  growth  rates.  One  might  be  concerned  be- 
cause  this procedure  ignores  the fact that these  two  series  might  differ 
due  to household  births and deaths.  However,  in the PSID data, many 
missing  consumption  growth  rates are not  due  to birth or death but to 
missing  data.  Thus  it is also not  appropriate  to assume  that the  differ- 
ence  between  the  PSID growth  in  consumption  and  that  in the  NIPA 
represents  differences  in true births and deaths.  More importantly,  the 
trend in the time series of consumption  growth  from the PSID is similar 
whether  one calculates it from averaging  levels  or averaging  first differ- 
ences.  See also the discussion  in the text. 
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This paper provides  a rich analysis of consumption  and savings choices.  It 
thoughtfully  and productively  integrates  data from an impressive  range 
of sources,  including  the  Panel Survey  of Income  Dynamics,  the  Con- 
sumer  Expenditure  Survey,  and  the  National  Income  and  Product  Ac- 
counts.  Parker documents  a large set of important stylized  facts. Three of 
those findings were particularly interesting for me: First, the changing age 
distribution  has played  only a small role in the consumption  boom of the 
1980s and early 1990s.  Second,  during  the consumption  boom  younger 
cohorts consumed  a larger share of their income than older cohorts did at 
the same age. Third, younger  cohorts had the same rate of consumption 
growth  as  older  cohorts  did  at the  same  age.  Parker has  resisted  the 
natural temptation  to draw too many theoretical conclusions  from these 
interesting  findings.  He should  be congratulated  on the scope of his em- 
pirical effort and on the modesty  of his subsequent  conclusions. 
However,  I do take issue  with one underlying  point of this paper. The 
Meghana  Bhatt provided  excellent  research assistance.  Laibson acknowledges  the financial 
support of the National Science Foundation  (SBR-9510985) and the MacArthur Foundation. 
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paper  is  motivated  by  the  consumption  boomh  during  the  1980s  and 
d990s. There is clearly some  evidence  for such a boom.  But this evidence 
is not overwhelming, and it appears that the consumption boom is now 
over,  an important  reversal that Parker underemphasizes.  For example, 
by historical measures,  consumption  is at a postwar  low relative  to stan- 
dard benchmarks  for human  and physical  capital. 
To tell this story it is helpful  to begin  with  Parker's aggregate  analysis 
of  consumption  benchmarks.  been  gins  by  poom  ing  out  that  the 
consumption  share  of  GDP  (i.e.,  CaY) has  risen  during  the  past  two 
decades.  Parker also discusses  total consumption,  which  comprises  both 
household  consumption  and  government  consumption.  Extended  time 
series  (1945-1998)  of C  Y and (C +  GevY  are plotted  in my Figure 1. 
Looking  at Figure  1, the boom  in C is clear, but  the  rise in C +  G is 
more  muted.  The  ratio (C +  G)/Y reaches  a postwar  peak  of  0.879  in 
1991. But by 1998 this ratio had fallen to 0.857, a level which  is less  than 
one  standard  deviation  (0.023)  above  the  1946-1970  mean  (0.838).  By 
these  calculations,  there has been  a temporary  boom  in total consump- 
tion, but we  have  settled back into a fairly typical spending  pattern. 
However,  comparing  consumption  with  current output  misses  one  of 
the  principal  economic  insights.  Forward-looking  consumers  should 
want  to smooth  consumption  and  hence  should  base  consumption  on 
permanent  income.  Any  effort  to  evaluate  consumption  normatively 372 *  LAIBSON 
should  take some  consideration  of the discounted  income  stream upon 
which  that consumption  is ultimately  based. 
The following  relatively  transparent  framework  can be  used  to com- 
pare total  consumption  to permanent  income.  Specifically,  divide  total 
consumption  (TC) by total wealth  (TW): 
C+G 
total consumption  TC 
total physical  and human  wealth  TW  NW  +  +  GNW 
r-g 
My total wealth  measure  has three components.  First, net worth of U.S. 
households,  NW,  is measured  by the  Federal Reserve's  Flow  of Funds 
Balance Sheets.  Second,  human  capital of U.S.  households,  YL/r  -  g), 
represents  the net present  value  of future labor income.  Here YL  is labor 
income,1 and r -  g is the difference between  the real interest rate and the 
growth rate of labor income.  I assume  r -  g = 0.05. Third, governmental 
net  worth,  GNW,  including  federal,  state,  and  local  governments,  is 
measured  by the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Balance Sheets,  which 
only include  financial assets and liabilities of the government.2  Necessar- 
ily, omitting  governmental  tangible  assets biases  down  government  net 
worth,  and  therefore  biases  up  the  consumption  ratio at all points  in 
time. But this level bias is not likely to bias the trend. 
Figure  2  plots  the  total  consumption  to  total  wealth  ratio,  TC/TW, 
during  the  postwar  period.  Two properties  stand  out.  First, the  time 
series did increase significantly  between  1980 and 1994, seemingly  revers- 
ing  a previous  downward  trend.  But the  1980-1994  increase  has  now 
been  entirely  reversed.  By the end  of 1998, the series  was  at an all-time 
low  for the postwar  period.  These results  do not depend  at all upon  my 
calculation of human  capital. To demonstrate  this point,  consider Figure 
3,  which  ignores  human  capital  and  plots  the  ratio  (C  +  G)/(NW  + 
GNW). Now  there appears to be no consumption  boom whatsoever,  and 
the only  prominent  feature  of the  data is the consumption  bust  during 
the 1995-1998  period. 
To develop  intuition  for these  effects,  consider just one source of new 
wealth  in the U.S.  economy.  In U.S.  equities  markets, price-to-earnings 
(P/E) ratios are currently  over  twice  their historical  norm.  At year-end 
1998, U.S.  market capitalization  was  $13.451 trillion,3 implying  that the 
1. Specifically,  I take  compensation  of  employees  from  the  BEA's National  Income  and 
Product Accounts. 
2. To a first approximation,  GNW  is roughly  equal  to the net  debt  of the  federal  govern- 
ment,  and hence  GNW is negative. 
3. Source: International  Finance Corporation. Comment  373 
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rise  in  P/E ratios  has  generated  a wealth  shock  of  approximately  $7 
trillion.  With  a  marginal  propensity  to  consume  of  0.05,  this  wealth 
shock  should  have  raised total consumption  by $350 billion,  or 4.1% of 
an  $8.5  trillion  economy.4  Alternatively,  note  that  U.S.  equities  have 
generated  real returns of approximately  13% per year since  1979, 6 per- 
centage  points  above  the historical  rate. Had U.S.  equities  realized  his- 
torically average performance  over the 1979-1998  period,  the U.S.  mar- 
ket capitalization  would  now  be approximately  $5 trillion, implying  that 
the  realized  excess  returns  produced  a wealth  shock  of approximately 
$8.5 trillion.  Assuming  a marginal  propensity  to consume  of 0.05,  this 
wealth  shock  should  have  raised  total consumption  by  $425 billion,  or 
5.0% of GDP. Note  that the actual long-run  rise in the total consumption 
ratio was only 3.6% of GDP [from a (C + G)/Y ratio of 0.821 in 1979-the 
lowest  value realized in the 1970s-to  a 1998 value of 0.857]. 
Parker is  right  to  point  out  that  there  was  an  anomalous  boom  in 
consumption  during  the  1980s and  1990s.  But my  calculations  suggest 
that  since  1994 the  anomaly  has  evaporated.  High  levels  of  total  con- 
4. Parker estimates  an MPC of 0.04, but his estimates  are almost surely biased down  due to 
measurement  error in household-level  wealth  data and omitted  variables in his regres- 
sion.  For example,  failing to include  a measure  of heterogeneity  in the taste for saving 
will  bias  the  MPC  down,  since  the  taste  for  saving  covaries  positively  with  wealth 
accumulation  and covaries negatively  (holding  all else equal) with consumption. 374  LUSARDI 
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sumption  are now  justified  by high  levels  of total wealth.  The ratio TC/ 
TW is now  at a postwar  low. 
Since  the  rise  in TC/TW was  temporary,  it may  be  relatively  easy  to 
explain. Transitory shocks like the 1980, 1981-1982,  and 1990-1991  reces- 
sions,  and the rapid expansion  of consumer  credit, can probably jointly 
explain  a significant  fraction of the temporary rise in TC/TW. 
Finally, collapsing  stock prices could  rapidly change  all of my conclu- 
sions.  If stock-market wealth falls dramatically (>30%), but consumption 
stays  the  same,  the  consumption  puzzle  will  be  resurrected.  Unfortu- 
nately, I am not able to forecast future values  of either the numerator  or 
the denominator  of my ratio. 
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1.  What  Is Saving?  Some  Measurement  Issues 
The  decline  in  the  saving  rate in  the  United  States  represents  a long- 
standing  puzzle.  Much research has been  devoted  to it, but so far there 
1.  What  Is Saving?  Some  Measurement  Issues 
The  decline  in  the  saving  rate in  the  United  States  represents  a long- 
standing  puzzle.  Much research has been  devoted  to it, but so far there Comment 375 
seems  to  be  more  agreement  on  the  reasons  that  cannot  explain  the 
decline  than on the reasons  that actually can. This paper provides  a very 
thorough  investigation  of  saving,  looking  at both  macro  models  and 
aggregate  data,  and  micro evidence  on  saving.  The empirical work  on 
household  data tries to disentangle  the reasons  for the decline  in saving 
by looking  at different  groups  in the population  and also by examining 
the role of the increase in wealth.  The main findings  are that there is not 
a unique  explanation  for the decline  in saving,  and the paper points  to a 
list of viable candidates. 
There are several issues  to address  when  considering  saving.  The first 
one is concerned  with measurement.  Consider  a simple manipulation  of 
the budget  constraint: 
Wt -  Wt-1  =  rWt-,  +  Yt -  Ct, 
where  W denotes  wealth,  C consumption,  Y income,  and r the interest 
rate. Saving can be derived  by taking the first difference of wealth  or by 
subtracting  consumption  from (capital and labor) income.  At the aggre- 
gate  level,  saving  has  been  measured  from  the  National  Income  and 
Product Accounts  (NIPA) as the difference  between  personal  consump- 
tion  outlays  and  personal  disposable  income,  and  from  the  Flow  of 
Funds (FOF) of the Federal Reserve System as the household  sector's net 
acquisition  of assets  (including  housing)  minus  its net  accumulation  of 
liabilities. These two measures  do not generally match, and many adjust- 
ments  are needed  to obtain comparable figures.  The most important fact 
is that capital gains  are not counted  in the above  definitions  of saving. 
However,  those  gains  have  become  so  important  that  if one  were  to 
include  them,  saving  would  not  even  show  a decline.  Gale and  Sabel- 
haus  (1999) have  examined  the measures  of saving  from NIPA and FOF 
and considered  several adjustments  to the official statistics related to, for 
example,  the  treatments  of  durable  goods,  inflation,  tax accruals,  and 
retirement  accounts.  Considering  those  adjustments,  the decline  in sav- 
ing is much smaller and the level of saving much higher than reported in 
the  official  statistics.  On  adding  capital  gains,  however,  the  figures 
change  dramatically. Saving is not only much  higher  than in the official 
statistics,  but  also  it shows  no  decline  over  time  and  has  actually  in- 
creased  in the  1990s, in particular after 1993. One  of the important  fea- 
tures of the U.S.  economy  is that while  we  observed  a decline  in saving 
(at least according to the official statistics),  we did not witness  a decrease 
in the stock of wealth. 
On  moving  from  aggregate  to  micro  statistics,  measurement  issues 
become  even  more problematic.  The two existing  data sets on consump- 376 *  LUSARDI 
tion,  i.e.,  the  Panel  Study  on  Income  Dynamics  (PSID) and  the  Con- 
sumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CEX), have  serious  limitations  for calculat- 
ing accurate measures  of saving.  For example,  the PSID reports informa- 
tion  only  on  food  consumption.  This  measure  is not  only  limited,  but 
also  noisy.1 The CEX has  information  on  total household  expenditure, 
but  suffers  from  severe  measurement  error in  income,  and  has  only 
limited  (and  noisy)  information  about  financial  assets.  In addition,  in- 
come  is  top-coded  in  the  CEX, and  this  makes  it difficult  to  calculate 
saving  for high-income  households,  which  are responsible  for a large 
share of saving  in the United States. It is also possible  to calculate saving 
using  wealth  data from the Survey of Consumer  Finances  (SCF) or from 
the PSID, but one has to deal with the issue  of how  to treat capital gains, 
which,  as mentioned  before,  are not included  in the aggregate  statistics. 
These observations  suggest  that one should  use much caution in inter- 
preting  the  aggregate  statistics.  As  far as  measurement  is  concerned, 
there are different  definitions  of saving,  and which  one  to choose  does 
ultimately  depend  on  the  research  question  under  consideration.  For 
micro data, there is no ideal data set to study  saving.  The paper uses  the 
PSID, but  much  data construction  and  imputation  is needed  to obtain 
accurate measures  of consumption.  More specifically, data from the CEX 
and NIPA are used  to construct  a more comprehensive  measure  of con- 
sumption  than the one reported in the PSID. 
2.  Some  Basic  Facts 
In addition  to the official statistics  on saving,  the paper  reports  several 
important facts, which  are not usually  present  in previous  works on the 
decline in saving. For example, the paper documents  that there has been a 
substantial  increase in the ratio of consumption  to income,  in particular 
after the 1980s. Additionally,  it shows  that the household  rather than the 
government  sector is responsible  for the decline in saving.  As mentioned 
before,  the paper  also shows  that while  saving  declined,  wealth  has in- 
creased a lot, at least in the aggregate statistics. However,  one should note 
that aggregate data hide important differences across households.  Wealth 
is very unequally  distributed  among  U.S.  households,  and in the  1980s 
the distribution of wealth became more spread out.2 In this respect, only a 
share of the population  enjoyed  capital gains on existing  assets. 
Household  debt also surged  in the past years.  Figures 1 and 2 of this 
comment  show  that  total  debt  per  capita  and  one  of  its  components, 
1. See Runkle (1991). 
2. See Wolff (1994). Comment 377 
Figure  1 PER  CAPITA  TOTAL  HOUSEHOLD  DEBT:  1960-1997 
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consumer  credit  per  capita,  have  increased  over  time  and  accelerated 
during the 1990s.3 This is also a potentially  important fact, and it should 
be  kept  in  mind  when  modeling  household  consumption  or saving.  I 
will return to it below. 
Perhaps a less well-known  fact is that the lack of saving is very perva- 
sive  among  U.S.  households.  Recent  data from the  Health  and  Retire- 
ment Study (HRS) show  that many households  arrive close to retirement 
with  little nonpension  wealth.  Table 1 reports the distribution  of finan- 
cial wealth,  housing  equity,  and  total net  worth  for a cohort  of house- 
holds  whose  head  is close  to retirement  (they  were  51-61  years  old in 
1992). Even though  these households  should  be close to the peak of their 
accumulation,  their median  financial wealth  is $6,000 and median  total 
net worth  is less  than $100,000. Much of the accumulation  is accounted 
3. Household total debt is the sum of home mortgage and consumer credit. Consumer 
credit includes automobile credit and revolving credit, such as credit-card  debt and 
unsecured  personal  lines of credit.  These  figures  are  from  the Flow of Funds  Accounts  of 
the Federal  Reserve  System. 378 - LUSARDI 
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for by housing  equity,  but it is an issue  whether  or not households  are 
using  housing  wealth  to  support  their  consumption  at  retirement.4,5 
These findings  raise some  concerns  about the financial security  of many 
American  households.  Saving  is  also  heavily  concentrated  among  the 
high-income,  high-education,  high-wealth  households.  For example,  ac- 
cording  to  Kennickell  and  Starr-McCluer (1997),  households  with  in- 
come  of $50,000 and  above  (in 1989 dollars)  accounted  for over  75% of 
total  saving.  Households  whose  head  had  a  college  degree  also  ac- 
counted  for a disproportionate  share of saving; depending  on the chosen 
sample,  estimates  go from 64% to 72%. Note  that if saving  is calculated 
to measure  the  ability of households  to finance  consumption  in retire- 
ment,  then official statistics may provide  an inadequate  picture,  since, as 
mentioned  before,  they  do not take into account the appreciation  of the 
existing  stock of assets. 
4. Financial wealth  is defined  as the sum of checking  and saving  accounts,  bonds,  stocks, 
and other assets  minus  short-term  debt.  Total net worth is the sum  of financial wealth, 
IRAs and Keoghs,  housing  equity,  other real estate,  business  equity, and vehicles.  Fig- 
ures  refer to the  sample  of households  whose  financial  respondent  is not  retired.  All 
values  are in 1992 dollars. Figures are weighted  using  survey  weights. 
5. See Lusardi (1999) and the references  therein. Comment 379 
Table  1  DISTRIBUTION  OF FINANCIAL  AND TOTAL  NET  WORTH, 
AGE  RANGE  51-61 IN 1992 
Financial  Housing  Total 
Percentile  Net Worth  Equity  Net Worth 
5  -6,000  0  0 
10  -2,000  0  850 
25  0  0  27,980 
50  6,000  42,000  96,000 
75  36,000  85,000  222,200 
90  110,000  150,000  475,000 
95  199,500  200,000  785,000 
Mean  46,171  61,613  227,483 
(Std. dev.)  (178,654)  (100,646)  (521,467) 
Note:  Author's  calculations  from  the Health  and Retirement  Study. 
3.  Explaining  the  Decline  in Saving 
While  basic  facts  are important,  the  important  question  is: What  ex- 
plains  the  observed  figures?  As  mentioned  before,  there  have  been 
many  explanations  for  the  decline  in  saving  in  the  United  States.  In 
Browning  and  Lusardi  (1996),  we  reviewed  as  many  as  twelve  pro- 
posed  explanations.  They  can be  summarized  as follows:  (1) the  aging 
of  the  population;  (2) changes  in  the  saving  propensities  of  different 
cohorts; (3) changes  in the structure of households  (e.g.,  divorce  rates); 
(4) changes  in the insurance  provided  by the government  (a decrease  in 
the  precautionary  saving  motive);  (5)  changes  in  the  distribution  of 
income;  (6) the  decline  in aggregate  growth;  (7) capital gains  on  hous- 
ing; (8) capital gains on stocks; (9) the increased  annuitization  of wealth 
(due  to Social Security  and  pensions);  (10) cash  payouts  to  sharehold- 
ers;  (11)  the  development  of  financial  markets;  (12)  changes  in  the 
thriftiness  and perception  of financial  security  (and other reasons  from 
economic  psychology). 
This list serves  to emphasize  that this topic has been  heavily  investi- 
gated,  and  while  we  can  perhaps  rule  out  some  of  the  explanations 
suggested  by past research, many  still remain under  debate.  The paper 
adds to the existing  explanations  by suggesting  that there is not a single 
culprit behind  the  decline  in  saving,  but  several  reasons  are likely  to 
coexist.  The  paper  offers  useful  and  original  insights  with  respect  to 
previous  work.  On the one  hand,  there is an examination  of a stylized 
macroeconomic  model.  How  do  we  reconcile  the  movements  in  con- 
sumption  with  changes  in government  policies,  the behavior  of interest 380 *  LUSARDI 
rates,  and  the  stock-market  boom?  On  the  other hand,  there is a close 
examination  of micro data, using  different methods. 
It is clear that, to be able to explain the decline in saving,  it is necessary 
to look at micro data. This makes it possible  to test different hypotheses, 
as well  as focus on well-defined  demographic  and economic  groups  and 
characterize  their  behavior.  The  micro-data  analysis,  however,  is  not 
without  limitations.  As mentioned  before,  there is not a single  data set 
that can be used to analyze  saving.  Data construction is not only cumber- 
some,  but it also requires making several assumptions  about the charac- 
terization  of  consumption.  For example,  the  imputation  of  health  ex- 
penses  is particularly difficult,  since  those  data are only available at the 
aggregate  level.  The  other  problem  is  that micro  data  are notoriously 
noisy  and it is hard to estimate  effects with  precision.  Nevertheless,  the 
analysis  of  household  behavior  is  important,  both  because  this  is  the 
sector responsible  for the decline  in saving  and because  aggregate  statis- 
tics hide important differences  across population  groups. 
The first problem  in modeling  household  saving  is determining  which 
theoretical  scheme  to refer to.  The paper  refers broadly to the life-cycle 
model,  even  though  it sometimes  hints  at the importance  of incorporat- 
ing a precautionary  saving motive.  By using  a fairly general specification 
of the  life-cycle  model  of saving,  at least three explanations  for the  de- 
cline in saving  can be rationalized.  The first one is that the proportion  of 
the elderly  has  increased;  since  they  should  be net  dissavers,  that may 
explain  the  decline  in saving.  This can be called  an age effect. An  addi- 
tional explanation  is that individuals  born in different  time periods  dis- 
play  different  saving  behaviors.  This may  be  due  to the  fact that their 
resources  are different  or that preferences  are different  across  genera- 
tions.  This can be called a generational  or cohort  effect.  A third explanation 
is that the behavior  of the macro economy  has affected  saving.  This can 
be called a time effect. 
Unfortunately,  it is not possible  to decompose  the observed  decline  in 
saving  into age,  cohort,  and time effects.  This is due to the well-known 
identification  problem  in  using  time,  cohort,  and  age  dummies:  Their 
effects cannot be separately  identified,  since year of birth (or cohort) plus 
age  is simply  equal  to time.  There are several  ways  to get  around  the 
identification  problem.6 One way is to use identifying  assumptions-for 
example,  restrict the estimates  on the time dummies.  This approach was 
originally used  by Deaton  and Paxson (1994) and is also implemented  in 
this paper.  While it has  several  advantages,  it leaves  open  the question 
of how  to interpret cohort effects: are they  due  to economic  conditions, 
6. See Heckman  and Robb (1985) and Attanasio  (1998). Comment 381 
for example  differences  in the rate of productivity  growth  across genera- 
tions,  or are they  due  to preferences?  It is not  possible  to disentangle 
these  effects  by simply  using  cohort dummies.  Another  alternative is to 
use  better  proxies  for  these  effects  than  dummy  variables,  and/or  to 
model  the  effect  explicitly.  While  this  requires  putting  more  structure 
into a specific  model  of saving  and making  assumptions  about the vari- 
ables necessary  to estimate the model,  it may provide  a clearer interpreta- 
tion  of the  cohort  effects.  An  additional  advantage  of this  approach  is 
that it allows  a more flexible specification  for these  different effects.  For 
example,  it is easy  to think of cases  where  age,  cohort,  and time effects 
are  not  simply  additive.  Kapteyn,  Alessie,  and  Lusardi  (1998) use  a 
simple  life-cycle  model  of  saving  and  show  that  the  introduction  of  a 
universal  social  security  system  in  the  Netherlands  in  the  mid-1950s 
introduced  an interaction  between  age  and  cohort  effects.  Rather than 
using  cohort  dummies,  they model  the cohort effect in wealth  and sav- 
ing explicitly  by constructing  measures  of productivity  growth  and the 
generosity  of the social security system  across different  generations. 
Which interpretation  to attach to cohort effects is a rather critical issue 
in  this  paper.  As  the  empirical  work  shows,  age  effects  can be  easily 
dismissed  as an explanation  for the decline  in saving.  This is consistent 
with the findings  of many other papers.7 It is almost intuitive  why  this is 
the case.  Changes  in the age structure of the population  are too slow  to 
be able to rationalize  the decline  in saving.  Note  that while  the decline 
started  perhaps  two  decades  ago,  it has  become  precipitous  since  the 
mid-1980s,  at least according  to the official statistics.  The importance  of 
time  effect  is not  clearly assessed.  In one  specification  of the  empirical 
work,  these  effects  are restricted ex ante. By making  the assumption,  as 
in Deaton  and Paxson (1994), that time effects are orthogonal  to a linear 
time  trend  and  average  to zero,  all (linear) trends  observed  in the data 
are attributed to age and cohort effects.  This restriction is relaxed when 
estimating  a consumption  function,  and in that context  time effects  are 
found  to be significant  in sign and magnitude. 
A main  finding  of the paper  is that cohort effects  are significant  and 
important  for  explaining  the  decline  in  saving.  More  precisely,  every 
generation  is  consuming  more  than  the  previous  generation  did  at a 
similar age.  This  finding  is relevant  per  se,  even  though  it is  open  to 
many interpretations.  First, note that it is partly in conflict with previous 
research.8 While other authors too attribute the decline  in saving  mainly 
to cohort  effects,  the  cohorts  that are responsible  for the  decline  differ 
7. See the discussion  in Browning  and Lusardi (1996) and the references  therein. 
8. Some  studies,  such  as Bosworth,  Burtless,  and Sabelhaus  (1991), report results  in line 
with  this paper that saving  has declined  across every  age group. 382 *  LUSARDI 
widely  across studies.  For example,  according to Boskin and Lau (1988), 
the generations  born after 1939 are the ones  responsible  for the decline 
in saving.  This is in contrast with  the findings  of Attanasio  (1998) that it 
is  not  the  baby-boomers,  but  the  generations  born  between  1925 and 
1939, that shifted  down  their saving.  In other words,  it is the generations 
that should  be at the peak of their saving during the 1980s that are saving 
less.  Gokhale,  Kotlikoff,  and  Sabelhaus  (1996) provide  yet  a different 
explanation.  According  to  their study,  it is mainly  the  elderly  that are 
responsible  for the  decline  in saving.  They  document  that the  govern- 
ment  redistributed  resources  from young  and future generations  to cur- 
rent old  ones  and  there has been  a sharp  increase  in the propensity  of 
older  Americans  to consume  out  of their remaining  lifetime  resources. 
It is not obvious  why  the findings  are so different,  and what  explains 
the  different  conclusions  reached  by  different  authors,  in  particular 
among  studies  using  similar micro data sets  and similar versions  of the 
life-cycle model  of saving.  We await a study that can explain those differ- 
ences  and generate  some  consensus  on this topic. 
Second,  there is the problem of interpreting  cohort effects when  using 
cohort  dummies.  What  do  cohort  effects  capture-differences  in  eco- 
nomic  circumstances,  or differences  in preferences  across  generations? 
The fact that all generations  consume  more than previous  ones  seems  to 
indicate a plurality of reasons  for the decline  in saving,  even  though  it is 
not obvious  which  are the correct ones.  For example,  transfers from the 
government  are a possible  explanation,  but they  have  affected  genera- 
tions  differentially,  and it is the elderly, if any, that have benefited  from 
them.  Similarly, changes  in the financial markets, and in particular in the 
opportunities  for borrowing,  should  have  affected  the younger  genera- 
tions.  Changes  in preferences,  such  as impatience,  could  also be chang- 
ing  across  generations.  In this  case  it is  difficult  to  expect  a dramatic 
change  across (adjacent) generations,  and any such change  should  have 
affected  prevalently  the younger  generations,  even  though  it is not clear 
which  ones  (individuals  born  after the  Great Depression,  or after the 
war, or the late boomers?). 
The paper suggests  that several  reasons  could be at work,  such  as an 
increase in government  transfers that explain  the decline  for the elderly 
combined  with  the  development  in the  financial  markets  that changed 
saving  for the young.  While plausible,  this explanation  requires further 
investigation,  since  it is not  easy  to rule out the possibility  that prefer- 
ences,  such as impatience  or attitudes  toward saving  (thriftiness,  expec- 
tations toward the future), have  changed  across generations. 
In the attempt to explain cohort effects,  the paper resorts to estimating 
a consumption  function.  To model  cohort  effects  explicitly,  wealth  and Comment  *  383 
the permanent  component  of income  are considered  in the estimation  of 
a consumption  function.  Thus,  the analysis  allows  a close evaluation  of 
how  much  of the increase in consumption  is attributable to the increase 
in wealth  that was  documented  earlier. 
The  results  from  estimating  consumption  functions  do  not  provide 
evidence  in support of one specific explanation  or set of explanations  for 
understanding  cohort  effects.  Overall,  the  estimates  suggest  that  a 
rather limited  share of the consumption  boom  can be explained  by the 
increase  in wealth.  But estimates  from these  equations  are not without 
difficulties.  If households  have  financed  the increase in consumption  by 
borrowing  from future resources,  then  low  wealth  (but not necessarily 
zero or negative,  which  in the estimation  is treated as a separate group) 
can be highly  correlated with  high  consumption,  and current estimates 
may  not  adequately  capture  this nonlinear  effect.  In fact, even  house- 
holds  with zero or negative  wealth  are found  to have high consumption. 
In addition,  much  attention  both  in the  media  and  in  some  current 
academic  research has  focused  on the effect of the stock-market boom. 
Given  the  importance  of capital  gains  in the  measures  of saving  men- 
tioned  before,  this is an important issue  to study.  However,  it is hard to 
evaluate the effect of the stock market from the estimates of the consump- 
tion function.  Even though  the dummy  for stock-market participation is 
statistically significant,  much  of the effect may be due to the increase in 
the wealth  invested  in stocks,  which  is not separately  identified. 
The theoretical  model  that underlies  the  calculation  of the consump- 
tion function  assumes  that borrowing  is severely  limited.  More specifi- 
cally, assets  are assumed  not to go negative.  This implicitly rules out the 
importance  of the development  of financial markets. As documented  in 
the figures  shown  before,  many  households  can borrow, and they have 
increased  substantially  the amount  of debt that they  are holding.  Simi- 
larly, it is not  surprising  that cohort  effects  are still present  in the  data 
after allowing  for wealth and the permanent  component  of income,  since 
those  two  variables  could  be poor predictors  of future resources  across 
cohorts. 
From consumption  functions  the analysis  shifts at the end  to the esti- 
mation  of Euler equations.  Thus,  from the examination  of consumption 
levels  the analysis  goes  to the examination  of growth  rates of consump- 
tion.  However,  it is hard to gain clear insights  into the decline  of saving 
from Euler equations.  On the one hand,  data in first differences  are very 
noisy,  and estimates  are often poor and unreliable.9 On the other hand, 
9. See the discussion  about estimating  Euler equations  using  micro data in Browning  and 
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we  do not know  whether  the Euler equations  are well  specified.  If some 
households  face borrowing  constraints,  then there should  be additional 
terms  in  the  Euler  equation  (a proxy  for  the  Lagrange  multiplier)  to 
capture  the fact that consumption  grows  more  for constrained  than  for 
unconstrained  consumers.10 While  borrowing  constraints  are explicitly 
considered  in the derivation  of the  consumption  function,  they  are not 
considered  in the derivation  of Euler equations.  Additionally,  apart from 
the  case  of quadratic preferences  or the certainty  equivalence  case,  the 
variance  of consumption  growth  should  also  appear in the Euler equa- 
tion.  This is because,  for households  that have  a precautionary  saving 
motive,  uncertainty  depresses  consumption  and  consumption  should 
grow  faster for households  facing greater uncertainty. While the deriva- 
tion  of  the  consumption  functions  relaxed  the  assumption  about  cer- 
tainty, the Euler equations  do not allow for uncertainty. 
Euler equations  have  the advantage  that one does  not have to specify 
the  income  process  of  households  or  their  expectations  about  future 
events.  Nevertheless,  specific  assumptions  have  still to be made  about 
how  to characterize preferences  and the economic  environment,  for ex- 
ample  whether  households  are impatient,  whether  they have  a precau- 
tionary  saving  motive,  and whether  there are borrowing  constraints  or 
other  market  imperfections.  To illustrate  this  point  more  clearly, note 
that in addition  to the  expected  interest  rate and  a set  of cohort  dum- 
mies,  wealth  (in logs) is added to the Euler equation.  The justification  for 
adding wealth  reported in the paper is to evaluate whether  unexpectedly 
high  asset  returns  are  the  causes  of  the  consumption  boom.  Even 
though  it is statistically  significant  only in one  specification,  the sign  of 
wealth  is negative  rather than positive.  However,  as is mentioned  in the 
paper too, wealth  might be capturing precautionary  saving,  i.e.,  the fact 
that  the  wealthy  have  lower  precautionary  saving  motives.  Alterna- 
tively,  it might  be capturing  the fact that the wealthy  do not  face strin- 
gent borrowing  constraints. 
In the  end,  the  analysis  of  consumption  from  these  three  different 
angles-the  decomposition  of the  data into  age,  cohort,  and restricted 
time  effects;  the  estimation  of consumption  functions;  and  the  estima- 
tion of Euler equations-does  not pin down  a single  explanation  for the 
decline  in  saving,  and  sometimes  it leads  to  somewhat  different  and 
conflicting  results.  It is plausible  that this is the result of different identi- 
fying  assumptions.  On  the  one  hand,  the  decomposition  into  age,  co- 
hort,  and time effects  requires making  assumptions  about the behavior 
of  one  set  of  dummies.  On  the  other  hand,  the  estimation  of  con- 
10. See Zeldes  (1989). Comment*  385 
sumption  functions  and Euler equations  requires making  modeling  as- 
sumptions  about the preferences  of individuals  and the potential imper- 
fections  in the  financial  and  insurance  markets  they  could  face.  Given 
that there is much  debate  on which  theoretical  model  can best  describe 
saving  (life-cycle  models,  models  with  intergenerational  transfers,  pre- 
cautionary saving,  etc.),  there is no safe avenue  for studying  the decline 
in saving.  Different  methods  have  their own  shortcomings,  and  overall 
the results of employing  those  different methods  in this paper may also 
be interpreted  as showing  how  hard it is to explain saving  well and how 
many  difficulties  the traditional theories  of saving  have  in rationalizing 
the empirical findings. 
To summarize:  this paper has taken up the difficult task of explaining 
the  decline  in  saving.  With  respect  to  previous  work  in  this  area,  it 
proposes  that there are several  different  explanations  at work  that can 
explain  saving.  Among  them,  a combination  of government  transfers to 
the elderly, changes  in preferences  (impatience  or attitudes  toward  sav- 
ing)  across  generations,  and  changes  in  the  development  of  financial 
markets  seem  most  promising  and a useful  avenue  for future research. 
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Discussion 
In his reply Parker noted  that the biggest  increase in the ratio of govern- 
ment and household  consumption  to GDP occurred in the 1980s; during 
the  past  4-5  years,  as  the  stock  market  rose,  the  consumption  ratio 
declined.  These facts pose  a problem for the view  that the consumption 
boom  is  the  result  of  rising  asset  prices.  Responding  to  Annamaria 
Lusardi, Parker argued  for the usefulness  of estimated  Euler equations. 
He said that the correlation of consumption  growth  and the real interest 
rate during  the  1980s,  which  he  uncovered  by  looking  at Euler equa- 
tions, is both interesting  and a potentially  important clue to the source of 
the savings  decline. 
Mark Gertler asked about the role of fiscal policy. He noted  that the rise 
and decline  of the Reagan-era deficits might help explain movements  in 
the  broad  consumption  ratio in  the  1980s.  Michael  Mussa  noted  that 
declines  in defense  spending  amount to a gain in wealth  for households, 
which  might  account  for some  increased  consumption.  Parker pointed 
out that defense  spending  increased  during the early 1980s; this buildup 
should  have  crowded  out consumption,  but there is no evidence  that it 
did.  Similarly, the recent decline  in government  purchases  as a share of 
GDP has not had a positive  effect on consumption.  Gertler remarked that 
the means  of financing  of government  spending,  i.e.,  whether  through 
debt or taxes,  may also matter. 
Giuseppe  Moscarini  asked  about the role of medical  expenses,  which 
are treated  as consumption  but might  better be thought  of as including 
an investment  component.  Some  studies  have  found  increased  spend- 
ing  on  medical  services  to be  a large part of the  increase  in measured 
consumption.  Benjamin Friedman noted the possible  effects of the "mar- 
ketization"  of the economy,  i.e.,  services  once provided  in the home  or 
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without  monetary  compensation  are now  bought  and  sold  in markets 
and are thus  counted  as consumption.  Examples  are elderly  people  liv- 
ing independently  (and thus paying  rent) rather than staying  with  chil- 
dren,  and  women  entering  the  labor force who  now  purchase  house- 
work and child-care services in the market. Friedman suggested  looking 
at consumption  subaggregates  by  age  group  to  see  if this  hypothesis 
makes  sense.  Ben Bernanke noted  that marketization  adds to measured 
income  as  well  as consumption,  which  moderates  though  it does  not 
reverse  the effect on the consumption-to-income  ratio. 
Friedman also noted  that in some sense  we have no option but to save 
wealth  created by asset  revaluations,  since current consumption  can be 
increased  only  at the  expense  of  current  investment  or by  running  a 
larger current-account  deficit, both  limited  options.  Indeed,  if individu- 
als  tried  to  consume  their  capital  gains,  those  gains  would  vanish  as 
everyone  tried to sell their shares.  Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas  noted  that 
U.S.  net foreign  assets  have  switched  from large positive  to large nega- 
tive in past decades,  so that the willingness  of foreign lenders  to finance 
the U.S.  consumption  boom  should  not be downplayed.  Agreeing  with 
Friedman,  Daron Acemoglu  said there is no easy way  of reconciling  the 
behavior  of the stock market,  savings,  consumption,  and the real inter- 
est rate with  a partial-equilibrium  model  and that a general-equilibrium 
approach is needed. 
Bernanke wondered  whether  a decline  in precautionary  savings,  aris- 
ing  from low  unemployment  and easier  access  of households  to credit, 
might  explain  the  trends.  Parker agreed  that  young  households  can 
borrow much more easily today than in the past and that they appear to 
be  taking  advantage  of that,  in that young  households  are consuming 
more  and  middle-aged  households  consuming  less  than  a generation 
ago. 
The discussion  turned to the cross-sectional  differences  in saving  and 
wealth.  Deborah  Lucas worried  about  the  adequacy  of  the  savings  of 
many older individuals.  Lusardi cited work showing  that a large fraction 
of  people  close  to  retirement  have  both  low  saving  and  low  wealth. 
Parker suggested  this might be partially due to the increased variance in 
wealth.  He also noted  that for low-income  households,  low saving  rates 
might  be  rational,  if social  security  plus  any  private  pension  replace  a 
large share of working-life  income. 